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Policy Impacts
of Investment Agreements
for Andean Community States
Gus Van Harten 1
September 2008

I

INTRODUCTION

This report examines the impact of certain investment agreements on government decisionmaking. Primarily, it examines the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded
between European Community (EC) member states and Andean Community (CAP) states.
Additionally, it examines the impact of the investment provisions of Economic Partnership
Agreement. 2 The analysis focuses on CAP states and, in some respects, on government
decision-making in strategic sectors.
II

STRATEGIC SECTORS

A focus in the report is on the implications of investment agreements for government
decision-making in strategic sectors. Strategic sectors are assumed to include (1) the resource
sector (where it constitutes a significant source of earnings on the balance of payments), (2)
basic infrastructure and core services including energy generation and distribution;
transportation; water (or wastewater) treatment and distribution (or disposal); financial
services; communication and broadcasting; and health care and education.
An indication of sectors considered sufficiently important to protect from foreign ownership
and control is offered by BITs that contain a commitment to pre-establishment national
treatment and, by extension, exceptions to this commitment that aim to preserve the state’s
right to ensure domestic ownership and control in certain sectors. 3 Most such BITs have
LLB, MES, PhD; Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto,
Canada; author of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). Note
that this is a consultation report; it does not constitute legal advice or a legal opinion. The report was
made possible by the financial assistance of Intermon Oxfam.
2 The discussion of the impact of EPAs draws on the investment provisions of the EUCARIFORUM EPA text, which is the only EPA text as yet finalized by the EU and its various
counterparts in ongoing EPA negotiations.
3 BIT obligations of states are always post-establishment in that they apply to protect an investor
after the investor has made an investment in the state. These include obligations to give postestablishment national treatment, MFN treatment, fair and equitable treatment including full
protection and security, protections against expropriation, guarantees of free capital transfers, and
umbrella clauses (for example). In contrast, certain forms of obligations may be referred to as pre1

been concluded by either the U.S. or Canada, both having adopted the same general
approach to their market access commitments in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
Thus, in BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada with CAP states, these sectors have been
excluded from pre-establishment and post-establishment national treatment and, in some
instances, from most-favoured-nation treatment: 4
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

oil & gas
mining
fishing
air and maritime transport
shipping
banking, securities, and other financial services
government insurance, subsidies or grants
state enterprises
broadcasting
telephone services
social services (e.g. public law enforcement, income security, public education, health
and child care);
investment screening generally.

Notably, these exceptions do not apply to other BIT obligations, including fair & equitable
treatment and limitations on expropriation (which are the provisions relied on most often by
tribunals to find a treaty violation and order payment of damages by the state). Also, these
sectoral exceptions in BITs concluded by the U.S. and Canada are one-sided in that the CAP
state is not allowed the same rights to favour domestic firms as its major capital-exporting
partner (i.e. the U.S. or Canada). In the case of nearly all BITs of this sort, the developing or
capital-importing state is obliged to open its economy to foreign ownership and control, and
to relinquish its right to attach conditions to foreign investment, to a much greater extent
than is the U.S. or Canada. This non-reciprocity of this aspect of U.S. and Canadian BITs is
discussed in more detail below.

establishment in that they apply to protect an investor even before it has made any investment in the
state. The obligations of national treatment and MFN treatment may be extended to the preestablishment stage (in which case they may also be referred to as ‘market access’ or a ‘right of
establishment’), typically in BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada. Also, a prohibition on
performance requirements also typically applies to the pre-establishment as well as the postestablishment stage of investment. (On the other hand, an obligation to give post-establishment
national treatment would likely include prohibitions on post-establishment performance
requirements that treated foreign investors less favourably then domestic investors.)
4 These sectoral exceptions are not included in BITs concluded by EU states presumably because
such BITs do not extend national and MFN treatment to the pre-establishment stage. This precludes
a need for EU states to protect their economies from foreign penetration and ownership in the way
that the U.S. and Canada seek to protect their economies under their BITs that extend national and
MFN treatment to the pre-establishment stage.

III

IMPACT OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

A

Key BITs

We begin with BITs concluded by Andean Community states. In total, CAP states had
concluded 70 BITs in force as of 1 June 2006. Of these, Peru had concluded 28; 5 Ecuador
had concluded 23; 6 and Bolivia had concluded 19. 7 Colombia had concluded only one BIT
in force (with Peru).
The most significant BITs concluded by CAP states are those concluded with a major
primary capital-exporting state. 8 Because they generally cover far more capital flows than
BITs concluded between developing states, it is these BITs that are most likely to generate
investor claims and thus pose threats to the regulatory autonomy of the host government.
More specifically, investments covered by these treaties are most likely to lead to disputes
and thus put pressure on CAP states to refrain from or restrict regulatory initiatives in order
to avoid the risk or threat of an investor claim.
Table 1 indicates BITs in force between CAP states and the 16 major capital-exporters,
where the BIT was by 1 June 2006.

BITs in force with Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United
Kingdom, and Venezuela.
6 BITs in force with Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
7 BITs in force with Argentina, Austria, Belgium/ Luxembourg, Chile, China, Cuba, Denmark,
Ecuador, France, Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
8 The ‘major capital-exporters’ listed are those states whose outward stock of foreign direct
investment was more than $100 billion in 2004, and whose outward stock either exceeded their
inward stock in 2004 or was exceeded by their inward stock by a ratio of less than 2 to 1: data from
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005) annex table B.2. All four
CAP states qualify as capital-importers on the basis that their outward stock of foreign investment
was exceeded by their inward stock by a ratio of more than 2 to 1.
5

Table 1: BITs between CAP states and the major capital-exporters 9
BOLIVIA

COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

PERU

EC:
BELGIUM
FRANCE
GERMANY
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
SPAIN
SWEDEN
UNITED KINGDOM

10-01-2004
12-10-1996
9-11-1990
22-02-1992
10-01-2004
1-11-1994
24-10-2001
2-07-1992
16-02-1990

---*9-03-1994
--2007 (assumed)
-*9-03-1994

-17-06-1996
12-02-1999
*25-10-2001
-1-07-2001
18-06-1997
31-05-2001
24-08-1995

*12-10-2005
4-07-1996
1-05-1997
18-10-1995
*12-10-2005
1-02-1996
17-02-1996
1-08-1994
21-04-1994

-----12-05-1991
6-06-2001

-----*17-05-2006
--

-6-06-1997
---9-11-1969
11-05-1997

2-02-1997
20-06-2007
---23-11-1993
--

Non-EC:
AUSTRALIA
CANADA
HONG KONG
JAPAN
SNGAPORE
SWITZERLAND
UNITED STATES

Source: UNCTAD Investment Agreements Online (Country-specific Lists of BITs)

All of the BITs of CAP states with the major capital-exporters entered into force after 1990
with the unique exception of the Switzerland-Ecuador BIT. 10 A number of the BITs 11
entered into force after the dangers posed by the investor-state arbitration mechanisms of
BITs became apparent by the late 1990s. Notably, no BIT was in force between Colombia
and a major capital-exporter by 1 June 2006 because BITs were regarded as unconstitutional
in Colombia until a decision in 2007 of the Columbian Supreme Court in which that state’s
BIT with Spain was found to be consistent with its constitution (and based on which it is
assumed that the Spain-Colombia BIT is now in force). 12

9 The date entered in the chart is date of entry into force of the BIT, unless otherwise indicated. An
asterix denotes that the treaty had not entered into force as of 1 June 2006 and that the date entered
in the chart is that of signature of the treaty rather than entry into force. In the case of the SpainColombia BIT it has been assumed that the BIT entered into force following a 2007 decision of the
Colombian Supreme Court in which the BIT was found to be constitutional. In the case of the
Canada-Peru BIT, it has been confirmed via non-UNCTAD sources that the BIT entered into force
on the date indicated.
10 The Switzerland-Ecuador BIT is likely one of the very first historically to provide for compulsory
arbitration of investor claims on the basis of a prospective consent by the state. Also, remarkably in
the current context, the treaty assigns ultimately appointing authority to the President of the
International Court of Justice. More recent treaties typically assign such authority to ICSID, the
International Chamber of Commerce, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or (for claims filed
under the UNCITRAL Rules) to an institution to be chosen by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
11 i.e. Bolivia’s BITs with Belgium/ Luxembourg, Spain, and the U.S.; Ecuador’s BITs with Italy, the
Netherlands, and Sweden; and Peru’s BIT with Belgium/ Luxembourg.
12 F. Cabrera Diaz, ‘Colombian court upholds constitutionality of BIT with Spain’ Investment Treaty
News (15 October 2007).

For a detailed summary of the inclusion of key provisions in Spain’s BITs with CAP states,
see Appendix B.
B

Claims against Andean Community states

There have been well over 100 known investor-state claims against developing states,
brought to arbitration by a foreign investor alleging a violation of a standard of investor
protection in an investment treaty, and seeking damages as compensation from the state.
Approximately half are ongoing. Typically, the investor can choose whether to initiate a
claim under the arbitration rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the UN Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL). Also, some BITs allow claims under to the arbitration rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce or the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The choice
of rules is significant for a number of reasons, not least because it determines the institution
that holds the vitally important authority to appoint the presiding arbitrator, where the
parties do not agree, and to resolve claims of bias against an arbitrator. The role of ICSID is
especially important because, in the case of ICSID annulment tribunals, all members of the
tribunal are selected by the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council, which is an ex officio
position of the President of the World Bank.
There are 20 known BIT claims against CAP states (see Appendix A). 13 Ecuador has faced
15 claims, of which 10 were brought by U.S. firms (in some cases operating through holding
companies established in the Netherlands), three were brought by Spanish firms, and one
each was brought by a Canadian and a French firm. Ecuador has been intensively targeted
for regulatory decisions it took in the energy sector, concerning both oil exploitation and
electricity generation. Ecuador has faced at least seven claims arising from the government’s
regulation of oil participation contracts, most recently in relation to the government’s effort
to recapture a larger proportion of windfall profits earned by foreign investors as a result of
high oil prices. Also, Ecuador has faced four claims arising from the privatization of its
electricity network in the mid-1990s.
Of the 15 claims against Ecuador, seven are ongoing. Ecuador was successful in its defence
of two and unsuccessful in two others, leading to awards of (US)$75 million and (US)$6
million, respectively, against the state. Three claims were settled and a fourth (Repsol,
discussed in more detail below) has reportedly also recently settled.
Bolivia has faced three claims, of which one (Aguas del Tunari) settled after intense public
pressure was directed against the investor. Two others are ongoing. Notably, in two of these
claims, Bolivia was targeted by a major U.S. or European firm that structured its Bolivian
investments through a holding company established in the Netherlands so that the U.S. or
European owners could bring a claim under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. This highlights the
importance of Bolivia considering withdrawal from its BIT with the Netherlands in the
Eleven have been brought under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, three under the Spain-Ecuador BIT, two
under the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT, and one each under the Canada-Ecuador BIT and the FranceEcuador BIT. All such claims were brought by investors from a major capital-exporting state against
the CAP state party to the relevant BIT. Two other claims have been filed by Chilean investors under
the Chile-Bolivia BIT and the Chile-Peru BIT, respectively.

13

event that the Netherlands is unwilling to renegotiate the treaty’s liberal provisions on
forum-shopping. In the third claim, Bolivia was targeted by a Chilean investor.
Peru has faced two claims. Notably, both were brought by an investor not from a major
capital-exporting state (i.e. from Chile and China, respectively). Peru was successful in its
argument that the first claim related to a dispute that preceded Peru’s consent to compulsory
investor-state arbitration in the relevant BIT, and thus fell outside the temporal jurisdiction
of the tribunal. The other claim against Peru is ongoing.
Unsurprisingly, given the constitutional position on BITs adopted by its Supreme Court until
2007, Colombia is not known to have faced any claims.
Prevalence of claims in strategic sectors
Of the 20 claims against CAP states, most have involved governmental decisions in strategic
sectors. In the case of Bolivia, the Aguas del Tunari claim implicated conduct of the
government (including its use and potential use of coercive force against citizens) in relation
to public opposition to rate hikes that followed the privatization of the water/ wastewater
system of the city of Cochabamba. The dispute engaged basic questions of accessibility and
affordability in relation to an essential service and the corresponding implications of marketbased approaches to service delivery. One of the two known ongoing claims against Bolivia,
Euro Telecom, involves a policy decision of national importance to renationalize the country’s
telephone network (prior to which the affected foreign investor held majority ownership of
the company delivering 60% of the country’s telephone services). The other ongoing claim
involves a mining concession. All claims against Bolivia may therefore credibly be said to
arise in strategic sectors.
In the case of Ecuador, as mentioned, seven claims have involved oil and gas exploitation
and four have involved the provision of electricity (generally in conditions of severe supply
shortage and corresponding emergency in the country). There is less information available
on the four remaining claims; one involved the provision of information technology services
to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, another involved a dispute over crude oil sales,
and two others involved a dispute over the expansion of a refinery. The latter three may
therefore be linked to the strategic sector of resource extraction.
Finally, the two known claims against Peru involved a pasta factory (sited near a protected
wetland) and a fish flour factor. Neither of these can be said to represent strategic sectors
although they may hold significance for industrial policy.
Thus, of the 20 known claims, 11 involved the resource sector (oil in gas; mining), four
involved electricity generation, and one each involved a major water/ wastewater system and
the nationwide telephone system, respectively. Three claims involved non-strategic sectors.
This indicates that it is likely that a dispute arising under a BIT will engage a strategic sector
of the host economy. Moreover, there are numerous other claims or awards, beyond the
scope of this report, that involve developing states and that engage the strategic interests of
those states and their populations in relation to resource extraction, energy, communications,
transportation, major water systems, and the financial and monetary system.

C

Awards against Andean Community states

To date, there have been at least 30 known awards of damages in favour of investors under
investment treaties (including both BITs and regional investment agreements such as
NAFTA). One award was against Spain (in favour of an Argentinian investor for the
smallest sum of any known award), one was against Russia (in favour of a German investor),
and two were against Canada (in favour of U.S. investors). The remaining awards have been
against developing or transition states. Amounts awarded have ranged from several hundred
thousand dollars (U.S.) to over one billion dollars.
Of the 30 awards to date, three have been for less than $1 million, thirteen for between $1
million and $10 million, four for between $10 million and $50 million, and nine for over $50
million (up to the award of $1.05 billion including interest in a case against Slovakia 14 ).
Most significant are the large or ‘catastrophic’ awards for over $50 million. The significance
of these awards is that they signal to all states the exceptionally potent power of the system
to discipline states and their populations. Exposure to investor-state arbitration thus impacts
not only the fiscal position of a government but also its ability to plan and cost out any
policy that could affect adversely the economic position of a foreign investor. Any such
policy could trigger a claim and an award against the state and, as such, all states that have
concluded a BIT and that import capital are impacted by the dramatic shift of political
bargaining power delivered by BITs in favour of multinational firms.
There have been only two awards to date against a CAP state (both against Ecuador – see
Appendix A) although more are likely to follow from ongoing claims, of which there are at
least ten against CAP states. The small number of awards is perhaps surprising given that
more awards have been made against Latin American states than any other region. On the
other hand, Ecuador has been the target of numerous awards and is likely to face more
awards or costly settlements. Further, both Ecuador and Bolivia have had to modify policy
decisions in the course of a dispute with an investor who brought a BIT claim. 15 Finally, it is
important to keep in mind that the cost of defending a claim – for many states involving the
hiring of expensive law firms in New York, London, Paris, or other major centres – poses a
fiscal burden in its own right for a developing state. For example, the present author was
advised by one legal advisor to the president of a large developing state that the cost of
defending a single treaty claim had consumed roughly half of the entire 2005 budget of the
country’s department of justice. In the extreme, the Czech Republic reportedly spent $10
million to defend itself against two claims brought by a U.S. investor. 16

Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v Slovak Republic (award on jurisdiction, 24 May 1999). Note that the
tribunal based its jurisdiction in this award on the incorporation into a contract of the compulsory
arbitration clause in a BIT which the claimant had not shown to be in force. As the origin of the
respondent state’s consent is connected to a BIT, I include it as a BIT claim.
15 BIT claims were settled by Bolivia in Aguas del Tunari and by Ecuador in IBM, Eurocontrol, Tecnicas
Reunidas, and (reportedly) Repsol.
16 UNCTAD, ‘Recent developments in international investment agreements’ (Research note, 30
August 2005), p. 15.
14

The most significant award to date against a CAP states is that of approximately US$75
million against Ecuador in Occidental No. 1 in a dispute involving eligibility for Value-Added
Tax (VAT) refunds (for the factual background of this dispute, see Appendix A). 17 The most
troubling aspect of this is the fact that the tribunal adopted a series of surprisingly expansive
interpretations of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT to favour the position of the investor. In this
respect, the award lacks credibility. In the first place, the tribunal adopted an apparently
contradictory position on whether or not the underlying dispute arose from a contract. The
tribunal concluded, on the one hand, that Occidental’s claim arose under the BIT (as distinct
from claims arising under Occidental’s oil contract with Petroecuador), with the implication
that the BIT’s ‘fork in the road’ provision did not preclude Occidental from bringing a BIT
claim despite Occidental’s pursuit of domestic remedies under the contract. On the other
hand, the tribunal concluded that the dispute concerned ‘the observance and enforcement’
of an investment contract, with the implication that the BIT’s exception for tax measures did
not apply to Ecuador’s decision to deny VAT refunds to Occidental Petroleum. Thus, the
tribunal approached the dispute both as one that arose only under the treaty and as one
relating to a contract, in both respects to resolve issues in dispute in favour of the investor
and thus facilitate the claim.
Also troubling, on its decision on the merits, the tribunal adopted an expansive reading of
various standards of investor protection (discussed in more detail below) in the BIT,
including the concepts of arbitrariness, national treatment, and fair & equitable treatment, in
order to find that Ecuador violated the treaty. Regarding ‘arbitrariness’, the tribunal
concluded that, even though Ecuador’s conduct (via its Servicio de Rentas Internas – SRI)
had not been motivated by ‘prejudice or preference’ but was rather based on ‘reason and
fact’. Nevertheless, the tribunal concluded based on a very loose framing of the standard, the
‘very confusion and lack of clarity’ arising from the SRI’s practices ‘resulted in some form of
arbitrariness, even if not intended’.
Regarding ‘national treatment’, the tribunal resorted to the BIT’s most-favoured-nation
obligation in order to remove the usual requirement that national treatment is only required
where foreign and domestic investors are ‘in like circumstances’. Instead, the tribunal found
that national treatment was not limited to a comparison of domestic and foreign investors
who were in like circumstances, and that it required Ecuador to provide the same treatment
on VAT refunds to oil ‘producers’ (such as OEPC) as it did to ‘exporters’ of e.g. flowers
(which unlike ‘producers’ were eligible for VAT refunds under Ecuadorian law). In addition,
the tribunal concluded that, although the SRI did not intend to discriminate against OEPC
or foreign-owned firms, the less favourable effects of the SRI’s decision were sufficient to
violate national treatment.
Lastly, the tribunal also adopted a broad reading of ‘fair & equitable treatment’. It adopted
the expansive (and controversial) approach of certain earlier tribunals by obliging Ecuador to
‘ensure a transparent and predictable framework for [investors’] business planning and
investment’ and to ‘act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently
in its relations with the foreign investor’. Yet further, the Occidental No. 1 tribunal concluded
that the state’s duty of transparency and predictability ‘is an objective requirement that does
not depend on whether the Respondent [state] has proceeded in good faith or not’. Also,
17

Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador (award on the merits, 1 July 2004).

with very little discussion and with no reference whatsoever to outside legal authorities, the
tribunal concluded that its very broad reading of fair & equitable treatment ‘is not different
from that required under [customary] international law’. This contradicted not only the
arguments of Ecuador but also those of other states, including the U.s. and Canada, in other
investment treaty arbitrations. Thus, the tribunal turned the words ‘fair and equitable’ into a
very onerous standard, almost assuredly surpassing that which would apply to governmental
activities in the investor’s home state under U.S. law. In subjecting capital-important states to
this intrusive standard, especially in combination with the remedy of a damages award
against the state, tribunals apply much more intensive constraints on the regulatory decisions
in developing states than apply to governments in North America and Europe under their
domestic law.
On these several issues, the tribunal in Occidental No. 2 adopted expansive readings of the
BIT, found a violation by Ecuador, and issued a substantial award in favour of Occidental.
Notably, a related BIT arbitration is ongoing in Occidental No. 2, where the same claimant
seeks more than one billion dollars in compensation. It remains to be seen whether the
members of the tribunal in Occidental No. 2 will adopt as expansive an approach in favour of
the investor as did the tribunal in Occidental No. 1 (for a list of tribunal members in both
cases, see Appendix A).
IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING

Bilateral investment treaties have three key elements. First, they apply broadly to virtually any
regulatory activity that affects assets of a foreign investor. Second, they lay out broadlyframed standards (open to varying interpretations by tribunals, as in Occidental No. 1) in order
to protect investors from regulatory activity, even where the activity is a general measure that
does not specifically isolate or target a particular foreign investor or groups of foreign
investors. Third, via the use of investor-state arbitration, they provide for the most
aggressive and intrusive form of treaty-based dispute settlement and award enforcement ever
established in the regulatory sphere. We begin with the significance of this third element –
which combines compulsory arbitration with state liability in the regulatory sphere, even for
legislative decisions – before turning to the scope and standards of investor protection under
investment treaties.
A

The dynamic of state liability

Investment treaty arbitration is a uniquely powerful method to regulate and discipline states
because it (a) allows direct claims by investors, often without the customary requirement to
exhaust legal remedies in the host state, (b) allows for an internationally-enforceable damages
award against the state for virtually any regulatory act, including legislation, and (c) relies on
private arbitration to resolve public law disputes in a manner that is structurally biased
against host governments. More specifically, in terms of this structural bias, BITs allow
privately appointed arbitrators (rather than tenured judges) to resolve regulatory disputes
between business and the state, and to determine the available policy space of host
governments, in a context where only one class of parties (investors) brings the claims –
giving arbitrators an incentive to interpret the law in favour of that class of parties in order
to encourage more claims and more appointments – and where the ultimate authority to

appoint arbitrators is exercised by organizations whose voting structure is controlled by
representatives of either multinational firms or capital-exporting states (speaking of the
International Chamber of Commerce and ICSID, respectively). Further, awards made by
tribunals cannot be reviewed for errors of law (other than jurisdictional errors or serious
procedural unfairness) in any domestic court. Lastly, in many cases, the relevant rules of
arbitration provides for the arbitrations and any awards to be kept secret unless both of the
disputing parties agree otherwise.
Notably, BITs provide for investors to bring claims against states as a means to discipline
states in their treatment of investors. BITs do not provide for states to bring claims against
investors for activities of investors that harm the public. In this respect, investor-state
arbitration is one-sided in that only one class of parties, the investors, brings the claims and
only one class of parties, the states, is ordered to pay damages for violation of the treaty. The
only (very minor) exception to this is the possibility that a state might bring a counter-claim
against an investor for breach of an obligation of the investor to the state (probably arising
under a contract that is brought within the rubric of the BIT by an umbrella clause). But
even in the case of a counter-claim by the state, it is the investor who decides first to bring
the dispute into the arbitration forum, thus triggering appointment of the tribunal. It is for
this reason, among others, that BIT arbitrators may be seen to have a bias in favour of
investors: if arbitrators do not interpret BITs in ways that favour claims by investors (while
retaining the basic legitimacy for the system) then there will be fewer claims by investors and
less business for the arbitration industry.
At the centre of the disciplinary power of BIT arbitration is the remedy of a damages award
against the state (involving ‘state liability’ for sovereign acts of the state). These awards of
damages are very different from a typical damages award in private or commercial law. They
may be issued by arbitrators in order to discipline the legislature, courts, or executive of a
state. This is important because it is rare in many states to allow state liability for legislative
or judicial acts, and for general policy or discretionary decisions of the executive, in the case
of conduct of the state that is found retrospectively to be unlawful. Such liability for the state
raises concerns as to its fiscal impacts and potential to deter legitimate regulatory measures
that would otherwise be passed in the public interest. Very importantly, outside investment
treaty arbitration, it is unheard of to allow such questions to be resolved finally by way of
compulsory arbitration (with comprehensive jurisdiction over future disputes), rather than
courts, because of the perceived bias that arises from the lack of objective guarantees of
independence in arbitration, especially (a) the lack of security of tenure and (b) the failure to
stop arbitrators from taking up outside remunerative activity alongside their adjudicative
work.
In many cases, awards under BITs arise from general regulatory measures that affect foreign
investors only indirectly and in ways that were not planned or intended by the host state.
Also, it is reasonable to conclude that many awards have been founded on interpretations of
BITs that were more expansive than what was anticipated by states when the treaties were
negotiated. The prospect of tribunals adopting expansive approaches to BITs, as in many
cases to date, exacerbates other key implications of state liability. First, states face the cost of
defending themselves against claims where the relevant law is uncertain or where it has been
subject to conflicting interpretations by past tribunals. As noted above, these costs can be
severe. Also, in the context of this uncertainty, the state may face greater pressure to settle a

case than would be the case if the law was reasonably clear. In the words of one U.S. lawyer,
the ability to sue under an investment treaty is: 18
‘an open invitation to unhappy investors, tempted to complain that a financial or
business failure was due to improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic policy,
or discriminatory treatment by the host government and delighted by the
opportunity to threaten the national government with a tedious expensive
arbitration.’
Second, states face the cost of damages awards. To date, as mentioned, there are 30 known
awards against states under investment treaties, usually against mid-sized developing states.
The majority of awards were for less than $10 million (although even an award of a few
million dollars can be significant for a smaller state). However, at least nine awards were for
more than $50 million. These awards send a message to all states that virtually any regulatory
measure, where it affects the assets of an investor in a significant way, could devastate the
state’s fiscal situation.
Third, the threat of a claim and an award may cause the state to abandon legitimate measures
that it would otherwise pursue in the public interest. For example, in the case of Ethyl 19
under the investment chapter of NAFTA, the Canadian government had banned a gasoline
additive that was manufactured by a U.S. firm. The ban was justified on environmental and
public health grounds, including scientific opinion that inhalation of its fumes could damage
the nervous system of children. The additive had been banned in California since the 1970s.
In response, the U.S. firm brought a NAFTA arbitration claim against Canada, arguing that
the ban was an expropriation without the required compensation. After the tribunal decided
that it had jurisdiction over the claim, Canada settled. In the settlement, Canada agreed to
remove the ban, declare publicly that the gasoline additive was not an environmental or a
health risk, and pay $19 million in compensation to the U.S. firm. 20
Unlike where a state consents to arbitration in a contract, a BIT consent to arbitration opens
the door to any investor, including investors unknown to the host government, initiating an
arbitration in relation to virtually any regulatory dispute. The state thus loses its relative
ability (under a contract) to predict and manage its liabilities arising from consents to
arbitration. Arbitrators are in turn given wide-ranging, comprehensive jurisdiction, and
W. Rogers, ‘Emergence of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
as the Most Significant Forum for Submission of Bilateral Investment Treaty Disputes’ (Presentation
to the Inter-American Development Bank Conference, 26-7 October 2000).
19 Ethyl Corporation v Government of Canada (award on jurisdiction, 24 June 1998).
20 Likewise, the Canadian government’s abandoned a proposal to require cigarette manufactures to
remove descriptive terms from cigarette packages and use plain packaging only following a threat by
cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris to bring a NAFTA claim on the basis that Canada’s proposed
regulation would be ‘unfair and inequitable’ and would ‘expropriate and destroy the affected
trademarks and brands in Canada as well as the substantial goodwill that accompanies them in
violation of both NAFTA and TRIPS’. Thus, the threat of an investment treaty claim may have
contributed to a government’s decision not to pursue a public health measure that was aimed at the
legitimate objective of deterring consumption of an addictive poison. See ‘Submission by Philip
Morris International Inc. in Response to the National Center for Standards and Certification
Information Foreign Trade Notification No. G/TBT/N/CAN/22’.
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tremendous power to evaluate and discipline states in relation to their past decision-making,
including choices of elected legislatures, general governmental policies, and final decisions of
the courts. This makes it difficult for states to govern in the public interest wherever there is
a risk of offending the business priorities of a foreign investor.
In the context of the EC, a concern has been expressed by governments where the
European Court of Justice applies its so-called Francovich doctrine to award damages in
favour of an individual who has suffered harm due to a breach of EC law by a member state.
According to the Danish and U.K. governments, as well as the EC Commission: 21
‘If questions of interpretation are shrouded in uncertainty and a Member State
exercises discretion in a reasonable way, it would seem unreasonable for it to incur
liability if it is later held that Community law precludes the national law or
administrative practice in question. Unblameworthy legal mistakes should not lead to
liability to make reparation.’
The very same concern arises in relation to state liability and compulsory arbitration under
investment treaties.
On the other hand, it important to point out that a host state does not lose all of its options
in the face of a BIT claim, even if its options are much reduced by a consent to investorstate arbitration. States retain the opportunity to negotiate for settlement, with the state’s
bargaining position tending to reflect the context in which the dispute arose and, especially,
the investor’s degree of interest in maintaining good relations with the host government or
avoiding adverse publicity arising from a claim. Investors will themselves wish to avoid the
cost of an arbitration, especially where the investor is not a major firm and where it is
evident that the state will fight it out in an extended litigation. Perhaps most importantly, the
ability of investors to collect on awards is not beyond question. States may opt to refuse to
pay on various grounds such as violation of domestic law or the unfairness of the award or
arbitration process. In such cases, investors would have to chase assets of the state in the
territory of other states, pursuant to the relevant arbitration treaties allowing for extraterritorial enforcement, subject to uncertainties about the value, location, and vulnerability to
enforcement of a state’s assets abroad. States threatened with or involved in an investment
treaty claim are thus well advised to take cognizance of their assets abroad and ensure that
they are not exposed in foreign states (e.g. France) whose domestic law adopts a liberal
approach to the enforcement of foreign awards.
Fiscal reforms in the extractive sector
The following expands on the implications of state liability under BITs in relation to fiscal
reforms in the extractive (or resource) sector. A fiscal reform in this sector would almost
certainly be covered by a relevant BIT (i.e. one to which an affected investor had access),
given the broad definition of the term ‘measure’ in BITs (see below). Thus, such fiscal
reforms would likely be subject to BIT arbitration and disciplines. Any BIT would be
‘applicable’ to such reform where the affected investor could demonstrate that it was an
Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany, Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others (No
46 & 48/93), Report for the Hearing, [1996] ECR-I-1034, para 57.
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investor of the other state party to the BIT, including by resort to liberal provisions on
forum-shopping (typically contained in BITs concluded by the Netherlands, the U.K., the
U.S., Canada, and Switzerland; typically not contained in BITs concluded by Germany,
France, Belgium, and Spain). Such forum-shopping provisions allow an investor to obtain
very easily the nationality of a state party to the treaty (and thus gain access to its arbitration
mechanism) simply by establishing a holding company in the state’s territory. In a number of
arbitrations against CAP states (especially under BITs with the Netherlands), the ‘investor’
was merely a holding company that was in fact owned by investors from a third state.
Notably, tax measures have been the subject of a number of claims by investors, including
against CAP states. For example, in Occidental No. 1, the decision of Ecuador’s Servicio de
Rentas Internas to deny VAT refunds to oil companies on the basis that ‘producers’ in the
oil sector did not qualify as ‘exporters’ under the relevant law and policy (which the tribunal
concluded was applied by the SRI in good faith and without an effort to prejudice foreignowned companies or preference domestic investors). Also, in Occidental No. 2, the target of
the investor’s claim has been an effort by Ecuador to renegotiate or terminate investment
contracts in the oil sector on the grounds that the investor breached the terms of the
contract or that the existing terms, in changing market conditions, did not deliver sufficient
benefits to the host state. 22
Importantly, as discussed above, even where a state acts in good faith as in Occidental No. 1
(and elsewhere), arbitrators have awarded damages against the state by holding that mere
uncertainty or confusion arising from the state’s decisions were ‘arbitrary’, because the
effects (though not the intentions) of the state’s decisions were ‘discriminatory’, and because
of the state was said to have an ‘objective responsibility’ to ensure fair treatment for foreign
investors.
On the other hand, fiscal reforms would not be subject to a BIT if they were tax measures
that fell within the meaning of an exception for such measures in the BIT. Typically, BITs
concluded by the U.S. or Canada contain express exceptions for tax measures. That said, the
exceptions may be limited in various ways, as demonstrated in Occidental No. 1, where
Ecuador’s denial of VAT refunds was found not to fall within the BIT’s tax exception
because the dispute with Occidental involved aspects of an investment contract with
Petroecuador. It is therefore important to read any BIT exception carefully to determine its
scope and conditions of application (and its level of uncertainty). Moreover, exceptions are,
like other BIT provisions, often ambiguous and, as such, open to interpretation by tribunals
so as to favour the investor. (Indeed, in some cases, arbitrators have concluded
controversially that ambiguity in an investment treaty should be interpreted in favour of the
investor interest because the purpose of investment treaties is to protect investors. 23 )
More broadly, in terms of the wider dynamic of state liability, any public program or service
that requires expenditure of public funds – whether for infrastructure, health or education
For a detailed discussion of Repsol’s participation contract in Ecuador’s Bloque 16 oil field, and
components of the contract that involve apparent under-investment by the investor and transfers of
costs to the state, see H. Llanes Suárez, OXY – Contratos Petroleros – Inequidad en la distribución de la
producción (Quito: 2006) p. 158-192.
23 e.g. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance v Pakistan (award on jurisdiction, 6 August 2003), para 116.
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services, public security, administration of justice, arts and culture, regional development,
and so on – will be impacted by BITs in two inter-related ways. First, the general budget may
be severely impacted by awards and by the cost of defending claims. Second, uncertainties
regarding the prospects of a claim or an award against the state in response to a proposed
fiscal reform may deter the state from pursuing the reform. This was discussed in relation to
the Ethyl case above. Ethyl did not involve a fiscal reform in the extractive sector, of course.
Nevertheless, the case demonstrates the pressure that can be brought to bear by
multinational firms, using an investment treaty, against even a major developed state.
Given that resource extraction is centrally important to the governments of all the CAP
states, and that it makes up a significant proportion of state revenues, it is predictable that
long-term contracts in that sector will periodically be subject to renegotiation pressures as
market conditions evolve. Indeed, it may be irresponsible for a state to stand back and not
seek a fairer share of extraordinary profits flowing to private firms where the price of a
commodity has risen rapidly and unexpectedly on international markets (just as a private
firm can be expected to seek renegotiation of long-term contracts where prices collapse).
Such efforts may be viewed as a part of the state’s responsibility to ensure that the value of
its extractive sector delivers commensurate benefits to its economy and population,
including by way of the state’s tax and spending policies.
B

The wide coverage of BITs

BITs apply to virtually any regulatory activity because they typically define key terms such as
‘investor’, ‘investment’, and state ‘measures’ in broad terms. The implications of this are
discussed below.
Democratic choice, governmental flexibility, and the definition of ‘state measures’
BITs apply presumptively to any measure of the state. In some cases, this is specified to
include, for example, ‘any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice’ under the
Canada-Peru BIT. 24 In other cases, the definition of measure is not laid out specifically but
would almost be regarded by tribunals to include any act of the state. In either case, the
treaties apply to virtually any measure of any branch or level of government. This is critical
because it means that BIT obligations and liabilities apply not only to government acts that
target or abuse specific investors, but also to general discretionary or policy choices of the
executive, to final decisions of the judiciary, and to general legislative measures, including
measures that are consistent with or even mandated by the domestic constitution. The
fettering of democratic choice and regulatory flexibility is in turn given force by the
exceptional power of the remedy, a damages award that is internationally-enforceable under
the terms of arbitration treaties including the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, and
the Panama Convention.

Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 1 –
definition of ‘measure’ (signed but not in force as of 1 June 2006).
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Regulatory activity and the definition of ‘investment’
The definition of ‘investment’ in BITs is also typically broad, such that it extends beyond
tangible assets to include such intangibles as market share, goodwill, intellectual property
rights, or ‘any asset’. The definition of investment in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT is indicative: 25
‘ “investment” means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such
as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes: (i) tangible and
intangible property...; (ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a
company...; (iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value,
and associated with an investment; (iv) intellectual property...; and (v) any right
conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law;’
Similarly, the Netherlands-Peru BIT provides: 26
‘the term “investments” shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly,
though not exclusively: (i) movable and immovable property as well as any other
rights in rem in respect of every kind of asset; (ii) rights derived from shares, bonds
and other kinds of interests in companies and joint ventures; (iii) title to money and
other assets and to any performance having an economic value; (iv) intellectual and
industrial property rights...; (v) rights granted under public law, including rights to
prospect, explore, extract and win natural resources.’
The breadth of the term ‘investment’ in investment treaties means that disciplines placed on
states will often overlap with disciplines arising from agreements on trade in goods (given
that investments may be linked to the production of goods for export or import), trade in
services (given that services may be supplied by the business establishment or ‘commercial
presence’ of a service supplier), or intellectual property rights (themselves typically included
in the definition of investment).
As a result of this wide coverage, the obligations of a CAP state under a BIT will typically
apply to virtually any governmental act that is carried out by any branch or level of the state
unless the act is expressly exempt from the treaty. Where a state is unaware of the degree of
foreign ownership and BIT coverage in a particular industry or sector, therefore, it should
assume out of caution that BIT liabilities could arise from regulatory measures in that
industry or sector.
Even so, to found an actual claim under a BIT, the assets at stake would need to be of
sufficient value to justify the cost of bringing a claim. This cost can be prohibitive for
investors (just as the cost of defending claims is very burdensome for states). Moreover, an
investor – before bringing a claim – must consider its wider interest in not jeopardizing its
relationship with the host government. In light of these considerations, a state should be
Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. I(1)(a).
26 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Republic of Peru, Art. 1(a).
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attentive to its BIT liabilities but not unduly intimidated. States have bargaining options too,
typically reflecting the size and importance of its market or resource sector for foreign
investors and their preparedness to refuse to pay an award.
Forum-shopping and the definition of ‘investor’
Under investment treaties, an ‘investor’ typically includes not only natural persons or
corporations that are owned directly by natural persons of a state party to the treaty, but also
mere holding companies that are established formally in the other state party to the treaty,
but are actually owned and controlled by investors of a third state. Thus, the NetherlandsBolivia BIT contains this provision to allow forum-shopping (as in Occidental No. 1) under
the BIT via the establishment of holding companies: 27 ‘the term “nationals” [i.e. ‘investor’]
shall comprise with regard to either Contracting Party: ... (ii) ... legal persons constituted in
accordance with the law of that Contracting Party.’
Based on such provisions, many BITs adopt a liberal approach to forum-shopping such that
a state – in the face of these BITs – must assume that any foreign investor in its economy
may be able to access compulsory arbitration under an investment treaty even where the
host state does not have a BIT with the state or origin of the foreign investor itself. A liberal
approach to forum-shopping, adopted not only in the treaties but also in the interpretations
of BITs by numerous tribunals – invites foreign investors to design their corporate structure
in order to maximize their opportunities to bring a BIT claim against the state in which their
assets are located.
Thus, in the Aguas del Tunari claim against Bolivia, 28 the U.S. firm Bechtel – after it became
apparent that there was public opposition to its privatized water utility in Cochabamba –
reorganized its corporate structure so as to insert three Dutch holding companies in the
corporate structure between Bechtel itself and the Cayman Islands firm (later moved to
Luxembourg at the time the Dutch holding companies were established) that owned the
Bolivian firm Aguas del Tunari (which was the firm that was a party to the Cochabamba
water concession). Tracing this chain of ownership, the actual majority shareholder of Aguas
del Tunari (and of the concession) was a U.S. firm that had no access to a U.S.-Bolivia BIT
(because none was in force at the time). However, the broad definition of ‘investor’ in the
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT allowed Bechtel effectively to re-create itself as a Dutch investor,
by way of Dutch holding companies, and to bring a claim against Bolivia under the
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.
So, investment treaties often protect far more than actual capital flows between states parties
to the treaty. Actual flows may not correspond to the legal arrangements for ownership of
assets. Investors can make themselves foreign by a paper transfer of assets among various
companies without any commitment to invest new capital to the host economy. This was so

Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Republic of Bolivia, Art. .
27

Aguas del Tunari SA v Republic of Bolivia (award on jurisdiction, 21 October 2005), para 69, 73, and
237, and para 4 and 10 (dissenting opinion).
28

in Aguas del Tunari, but also in the Fedax arbitration, 29 where the tribunal allowed a Dutch
company to bring a BIT claim against Venezuela in a dispute concerning promissory notes
issued by the Venezuelan government. Prior to the claim, the promissory notes had been
transferred to the Dutch company by a Venezuelan firm. Venezuela’s argument that the
investor had not made an actual investment in the country’s economy was, however,
rejected.
C

The standards of investor protection

BITs lay out broadly-framed standards by which the conduct of host states for investment is
to be evaluated in the arbitration of an investor claim. The standards typically include (most
prominently): national treatment (denial of which is often called ‘discriminatory’ treatment),
most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment, fair & equitable treatment (including for present
purposes ‘full protection and security’), limitations on expropriation (or ‘deprivation’),
specific prohibitions on performance requirements (both pre- and post-establishment), and
duties to observe obligations to investors (also called ‘umbrella clauses’). Each of these is
discussed below.
In the 30 awards against states to date, a tribunal based its finding that the state violated the
relevant treaty on fair and equitable treatment in 23 cases (in one case, this was via an MFN
clause in the treaty), limitations on expropriation in ten cases, national treatment in seven
cases, an umbrella clause in five cases, and prohibitions on performance requirements in one
case. In a number of cases, multiple standards were found to have been violated by the state.
National treatment
Although the language used in the treaties may vary, generally speaking ‘national treatment’
requires a host state to treat foreign investors from the other state party ‘no less favourably’
than it treats domestic persons or firms who are in similar circumstances (although it may
treat foreign investors more favourable, as in the provision of tax holidays or exemptions
from regulatory requirements). To demonstrate, under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT: 30
‘Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on
a basis no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to investment or
associated activities of its own nationals or companies....’
And, according to the Spain-Colombia BIT: 31
‘Cada Parte Contratante... no obstaculizará, mediante medidas injustificadas o
discriminatorias, la gestión, el mantenimiento, el desarrollo, la utilización, el disfrute,
la extensión, la venta ni, en su caso, la liquidación de tales inversiones.’
Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (award on jurisdiction, 11 July 1997), para 18 and 24-25.
Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. II(1).
31
Acuerdo para la promoción y protección recíproca de inversiones entre la República de Colombia y el Reino de
España, Art. 3 (not in force as of June 2006).
29
30

State measures that favour domestic firms or employees are commonly said to be
‘discriminatory’ against foreign investors.
National treatment generally applies to the post-establishment stage of an investment, but
may be extended to the ‘pre-establishment’ stage. Where a treaty extends national treatment
to the pre-establishment stage, any restrictions on foreign ownership and control of the
economy – including its strategic sectors – are also forbidden (unless the treaty specifically
exempts them from the pre-establishment obligation). Pre-establishment national treatment
is also often referred to as ‘market access’ or as a ‘right of establishment’. Under an absolute
rule of pre-establishment national treatment, a state would be required to allow 100 percent
foreign access and ownership in every sector of its economy.
For this reason, states include positive exceptions to pre-establishment national treatment.
Exceptions adopted by states parties to BITs between CAP states and the U.S. or Canada
were discussed briefly above. Table 2 offers more detail on such exceptions in relevant BITs.
Table 2: Exceptions to national/ MFN treatment in U.S. or Canadian BITs with CAP states
State (BIT)

Exceptions from national treatment and/or MFN treatment

Bolivia (U.S.-Bolivia)

land ownership within 50 kilometers of national borders, in so far as
required by Article 25 of the Constitution; air transport; transportation
on interior navigable waterways; ownership of international passenger
and freight land transportation companies; subsidies or grants,
including government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance;
obligation of foreign construction and consulting companies
participating in public sector tenders to associate with a Bolivian
company; and leasing of minerals and pipeline rights of way on
government lands, regarding which national treatment is subject to
limitations set forth in Article 25 of the Constitution.

Columbia (NA)

No BITs concluded with the U.S. or Canada.

Ecuador (Canada-Ecuador)

land ownership within 50 kilometres of the national borders, and
within territories designated as reserved areas such as national parks.

Ecuador (U.S.-Ecuador)

traditional fishing (not including fish processing or aquaculture); and
ownership and operation of broadcast radio and television stations.

Canada (Canada-Ecuador)

social services (i.e. public law enforcement; correctional services;
income security or insurance; social security or insurance; social
welfare; public education; public training; health and child care);
services in any other sector; government securities; residency
requirements for ownership of oceanfront land; measures
implementing the Northwest Territories and the Yukon Oil and Gas
Accords.

Canada (Canada-Peru)

acquisitions of Canadian businesses subject to the Investment Canada
Act; commercial air transport; duty-free licences at land border
crossings; examiners of cultural property; fishing licensing; licensed
custom brokerages; limitations on interests in controlled land;
limitations on ownership of uranium mining property; oil and gas
production and development; the Hibernia Project; ownership of an
existing state enterprise or governmental entity; Canadian ownership
requirements of federally incorporated corporations; requirement that
25 per cent of directors of federally-incorporated corporations be
resident Canadians; limitations on voting shares held in Air Canada,
Cameco Limited, Nordion International Inc., Theratronics
International Limited, and Canadian Arsenals Limited; Patent Office
and Trade-Mark Office representation; pilotage services; ship
registration.

United States (U.S.-Bolivia):

air and maritime transport, and related activities; atomic energy;
banking, securities, and other non-insurance financial services;
customhouse brokers; fisheries; insurance (obligation extends to
NAFTA-level treatment); licenses for broadcast, common carrier, or
aeronautical radio stations; COMSAT; subsidies or grants, including
government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance; state and local
measures exempt from Article 1102 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement pursuant to Article 1108 thereof; landing of
submarine cables; one-way satellite transmissions of direct-to-home
(DTH) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) television services and of
digital audio services; leasing of minerals and pipeline rights of way on
government lands, which is subject to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act.

United States (U.S.-Ecuador)

air transportation; banking; customhouse brokers; government grants;
government insurance and loan programs; energy and power
production; insurance; maritime services and maritime-related
services; mining on the public domain; ocean and coastal shipping;
ownership of real property; ownership and operation of common
carrier radio and television stations; ownership of shares in the
Communications Satellite Corporation; primary dealership in United
States government securities; provision of common carrier telephone
and telegraph services; provision of submarine cable services; and use
of land and natural resources.

Very importantly, under each of these BITs, the Andean Community (i.e. capital-importing)
state enjoys far fewer exceptions from national treatment and MFN treatment. Thus, CAP
states accepts much wider obligations to allow foreign entry into the economy, free from
screening requirements or other conditions of access, and to refrain from preferencing
domestic firms in their development strategy. 32 The treaties are thus non-reciprocal in this
critical respect. It is obviously counter-intuitive, from a development perspective, for the
developing or capital-importing state to be required to expose itself to greater penetration by
On the other hand, even in the case of the U.S. and Canada, significant gaps are apparent where
sectoral exceptions included in one BIT are omitted from another BIT, particularly where the latter
permits forum-shopping.
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foreign capital than does the capital-exporting state. That is, the treaties reflect a double
standard in that CAP states are precluded from taking steps to ensure domestic ownership
(whether public or private) in strategic sectors where, in many cases, their developed country
partner under the BIT is permitted to do just that. 33
The same non-reciprocity does not arise in the case of BITs concluded by EU states
because, as discussed above, those BITs do not extend national and MFN treatment to the
pre-establishment stage of investment, and thus they do not necessitate sectoral exceptions
to protect the states parties’ economies from foreign penetration and ownership.
One approach to national treatment is that it is normally violated only where a state
specifically targets a foreign investor for discriminatory treatment because the investor is
foreign. This approach would be a reasonably predictable one that probably accords with the
intentions of many states when BITs were negotiated. However, the interpretation of
national treatment by tribunals has not been so straightforward. It has been characterized by
difficult questions of, for example, whether ‘like circumstances’ must be shown to exist and,
if so, what constitutes like circumstances; whether arbitrators should focus on treatment
given to a single foreign investor only or on treatment given to foreign investors as a group;
and whether the treatment afforded to foreign investors should be compared to domestic
investors as whole or merely to any singular case where a domestic investor was treated
more favourably. There are variations in the answers given to these questions thus far by
tribunals, with major implications for the ability of states to assess their treaty obligations
and liabilities.
National treatment also goes beyond intended discrimination by a state to include so-called
de facto discrimination. Thus, a violation of the standard may occur when a state measure,
though neutral on its face, has a discriminatory effect on foreign investors relative to
whatever category of domestic investors that is selected for comparison by the tribunal. For
example, in Occidental No. 1, the tribunal concluded that, although Ecuador did not intend to
discriminate against OEPC or foreign-owned firms in that case, the less favourable effects of
the Servicio de Rentas Interna’s decision to disallow VAT refunds to the investor (and other
oil producers) was sufficient to violate national treatment.
This concept of de facto discrimination is potentially so broad that, in its extreme, any exercise
of public authority that differentiated between investors would be prohibited. In the Pope &
Talbot arbitration under NAFTA, the tribunal adopted this broad approach, concluding that
‘any differences in treatment’ presumptively violates national treatment ‘unless they have a
reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1) do not distinguish, on their face or
de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA’. 34 Thus, the Pope & Talbot
tribunal adopted an extraordinarily expansive reading of national treatment, and then
Of course, it is unlikely that CAP states would offer a sufficient base of capital in order to generate
domestic investors that in turn could acquire significant levels of ownership and control in strategic
sectors in the U.S. or Canada. However, by way of forum-shopping, foreign investors originating in a
CAP state could conceivably tap capital from a third country in order to penetrate the North
American market.
34 Pope & Talbot Inc v Government of Canada (award on the merits, phase 2, 10 April 2001), para 78-79.
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subjected that interpretation to a vague set of exceptions. Depending on how those
exceptions are in turn interpreted by tribunals, and given that most governmental activity
inherently involves differentiation among subjects of regulation, a presumptive prohibition
on any differentiation between investors effectively exposes a wide range of commonplace
regulatory measures to investor claims.
Most-favoured-nation treatment
Similar to national treatment, the standard of MFN treatment requires a state to treat foreign
investors from the other states party to the investment treaty no less favourably than it treats
investors from third states. Thus, different protections may be extended from one BIT to
another in the full set of treaties concluded by the state, to the benefit of investors.
According to the U.K.-Ecuador BIT: 35
‘Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable
than that which it accords to... national or companies of any third State.
Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the
other Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
or disposal of their investments, to treatment less favourable than that which it
accords to... national or companies of any third State.’
Likewise, according to the Canada-Peru BIT: 36
‘Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of a non-Party with respect to
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale
or other disposition of investments in its territory.’
These clauses prohibit a state party to the BIT from giving more favourable treatment to the
investors of any third state, including another capital-importing or developing state. An
exception to this requirement in many BITs exists where more favourable treatment is
granted by virtue of the state’s participation in a free trade zone, customs union, or common
market, although the applicability of such an exception depends (as always) on the specific
language of the BIT.
The implication of a broad reading of MFN treatment, as interpreted broadly by many
tribunals, is that investors can ‘shop around’ to pick the best set of protections available to
them from all treaties concluded by a host state.

Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 3.
36 Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 4(1)
(signed but not in force as of 1 June 2006).
35

When MFN treatment is relied on to extend substantive protections from one treaty to
another treaty under which the investor has brought a claim, MFN treatment is typically
referred to alongside the relevant substantive standard in the other treaty. Thus, in Occidental
No. 1, the tribunal relied on the BIT’s MFN obligation to remove a requirement in that BIT
that national treatment be limited to situations in which foreign and domestic investors were
in like circumstances. Using MFN to drop this requirement, by referring to another BIT of
Ecuador that did not refer explicitly to ‘in like circumstances’, the tribunal concluded that the
combination of national treatment and MFN treatment required Ecuador to provide the
same VAT treatment to oil ‘producers’ (such as Occidental) as it did to ‘exporters’ (which
unlike ‘producers’ were eligible for VAT refunds under Ecuadorian law). This reading
operated in favour of Occidental (and investors in general) by expanding the situations in
which a state’s measure can be found to ‘discriminate’ in favour of domestic investors.
In a number of cases, MFN treatment has been used, remarkably, to expand not only
substantive obligations but also procedural aspects of a state’s underlying consent to
compulsory arbitration. Thus, some BITs contain limitations on the investor’s right to bring
a BIT claim (such as a fork in the road clause or a duty of the investor to exhaust local
remedies). In Maffezini 37 and other arbitrations, 38 such limitations were discarded on the basis
that a commitment to MFN treatment encompassing procedural benefits of other treaties
that were more favourable to the investor. Other tribunals, on the other hand, have rejected
this interpretation of MFN treatment, concluding that MFN does not extend beyond
substantive protections unless the relevant MFN clause clearly refers to procedural
protections as well. The Maffezini position exposes a state to compulsory arbitration with
respect to all its investment treaties where it has consented to compulsory arbitration in just
a single BIT. The latter position, on the other hand, probably corresponds to the views of
most states when the treaties were negotiated (if they turned their mind to the issue).
Fair & equitable treatment (including full protection and security)
Typically, investment treaties require host states to afford ‘fair and equitable treatment’, as
well as ‘full protection and security’, to foreign investors. Different treaties phrase these
obligations in different ways, but all provide for a minimum level of treatment that states
must provide to foreign investors. Thus, regardless of the treatment given to a state’s own
investors, the treatment of foreign investors must not fall below this floor set by the treaty.
To illustrate, the Spain-Bolivia BIT provides: 39
‘Las inversiones realizadas por inversores de una Parte Contratante en el territorio de
la otra Parte Contratante recibirán un tratamiento justo y equitativo y disfrután de
plena protección y seguridad. Ninguna de las Partes Contratantes deberá, en ningún

Maffezini (Emilio Agustin) v Kingdom of Spain (award on jurisdiction, 25 January 2000), para 65.
Azurix Corp v Argentine Republic (award on jurisdiction, 8 December 2003), para 60; Sempra Energy
International v Argentine Republic (award on jurisdiction, 11 May 2005), para 92-4; Continental Casualty
Company v Argentine Republic (award on jurisdiction, 22 February 2006), para 77-8 and 86.
39 Acuerdo para la promoción y la protección recíproca de inversiones entre el Reino de España y la República de
Bolivia, Art. 3(1).
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caso, otorgar a tales inversiones tratamiento menos favorable que el requerido por el
Derecho Internacional.’
Similarly, according to the Canada-Ecuador BIT: 40
‘Each Contracting Party shall accord investments or returns of investors of the other
Contracting Party: (a) fair and equitable treatment in accordance with principles of
international law, and (b) full protection and security.’
Finally, according to the Netherlands-Peru BIT:41
‘Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the investments
of nationals of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or
discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
or disposal thereof by those nationals.
More particularly, each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments full
security and protection....’
The fair and equitable treatment standard has been relied on more often than any other as a
basis for finding a violation of the treaty and awarding damages against the state. This is not
surprising given the variety of meanings that can be attached to the standard, and the very
wide range of government activity that can potentially be scrutinized on grounds that it was
‘unfair’ or ‘inequitable’.
The CMS award against Argentina gives an example of a broad interpretation of the
standard. Here the tribunal concluded that fair and equitable treatment, although ‘somewhat
vague’, nevertheless required Argentina to maintain a stable legal and business environment
in the midst of a financial crisis, and that this was ‘an objective requirement unrelated to
whether [Argentina] has had any deliberate intention or bad faith…’. 42 On this expansive
reading, the tribunal decided that Argentina’s devaluation of the peso violated its BIT with
the U.S., requiring payment of a large award to a U.S. investor and heightening the prospect
of further awards (which have indeed followed) against the country. Also, the CMS tribunal,
along with other tribunals, has rejected Argentina’s argument (echoed by other states,
including the U.S. and Canada) that fair and equitable treatment is simply a component of,
and thus limited by, the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ as understood in customary
international law. In response to this submission by states, tribunals have tended either to
reject the argument outright or to adopt an expansive view of the customary standard itself,
typically with little or no discussion of relevant sources of international law. Thus, the CMS
tribunal – without mention of state practice and opinio juris, relevant cases, or academic
writings on international law – incredibly concluded that its far-reaching approach to fair and
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Art. II(2).
41 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Republic of Peru, Art. 3(1) and (2).
42 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic (award on the merits, 12 May 2005), para 274
and 280.
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equitable treatment under the U.S.-Argentina BIT was ‘not different from the international
law minimum standard and its evolution under customary international law’. 43
A similarly expansive reading of fair and equitable treatment was adopted by the tribunal in
Occidental No. 1, leading to a substantial award against Ecuador, as discussed above. On the
whole, it is this standard that presents the greatest uncertainty, and thus the greatest threat,
to fiscal planning and regulatory decision-making on the part of states. The standards places
an alarmingly wide-ranging discretionary power in the hands of arbitrators to decide how
states should resolve conflicts between investors and other social groups according to the
collective interest of the community as a whole.
Limitations on expropriation, including ‘regulatory’ expropriation
A well-known motivation for the conclusion of BITs was to protect assets of foreign
investor from expropriation or nationalization by the host state. According to the U.S.Bolivia BIT: 44
‘Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization... except
for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process of law and
the general principles of treatment provided for in Article II (providing for fair and
equitable treatment).’
And, under the Spain-Peru BIT: 45
‘La nacionalización, expropriación, o cualquier otra medida de características o
efectos similares que pueda ser adoptada por las autoridades de una parte contratante
contra las inversiones de inversores de la otra parte contratante en su territorio
deberá aplicarese exclusivamente por razones de necesidad o utilidad publica
conforme a las disposiciones legales y en ningún caso será discrimnatoria. La parte
contratatnte que adoptara estas medidas pagara al inversor o a su derecho-habiente,
sin demora injustificada, una indemnización adecuada, en moneda convertible y
libremente tranferible.’
What was less anticipated was the degree to which these expropriation standards were open
to expansive interpretations going beyond direct expropriation to include so-called indirect
or ‘creeping’ or ‘regulatory’ expropriation by the state. So, general measures of the state that
leave an investor’s ownership title intact, but that otherwise cause the investor economic
harm (even incidental harm, potentially) may be regarded as a compensable expropriation
that requires payment of market value damages to the investor. This broad definition was

CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic (award on the merits, 12 May 2005), para 284.
Treaty between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. III(1).
45 Acuerdo para la promoción y la protección recíproca de inversiones entre la República de Perú y el Reino de España,
Art. 5.
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adopted, for example, in the (infamous) decision in Metalclad, where the tribunal concluded
that expropriation included: 46
… not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright
seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-beexpected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit
of the host State.
Such a broad reading is possible under virtually all investment treaties (with the qualified
exception of some recent treaties concluded by the U.S. and Canada that limit the scope of
regulatory expropriation to an extent) and would require compensation for any exercise of
public authority that significantly reduced the value of an investment. According to Tysoe J.
of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Canada, the reading of expropriation adopted by
the tribunal in Metalclad was ‘extremely broad’ and ‘sufficiently broad to include a legitimate
rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning authority’. 47
To illustrate further, a similarly expansive interpretation was adopted in the Tecmed
arbitration under the Spain-Mexico BIT. Here the tribunal declined to consider public
benefits of government acts that are indirectly expropriatory as a basis for differentiating
expropriation from regulation. It declared: ‘we find no principle stating that regulatory
administrative actions are per se excluded from the scope of the [BIT], even if they are
beneficial to society as a whole – such as environmental protection’. 48
Prohibitions on performance requirements
All BITs that contain a national treatment obligation prohibit performance requirements that
treat foreign investors less favourably than domestic investors. On the other hand, BITs
typically do not prohibit any benefits that are given to foreign investors, but not domestic
investors. BITs concluded by the U.S. and Canada, modeled after NAFTA, go further by
prohibiting a specific list of performance requirements at both the pre-establishment and
post-establishment stage, even where the performance requirements are applied to domestic
as swell as foreign investors. The prohibitions apply to various performance requirements
that governments have put in place as entry conditions for foreign investors. Asian states in
particular used this tool historically as a component, alongside market mechanisms, of their
industrial development strategies. 49 Typically, such conditions require the investor to export
a minimum proportion of its production or to use a minimum proportion of local employees
or inputs in its domestic operations. The objective of such performance requirements was to
promote a wider policy of export-oriented development, employment, and enhanced
46
47

Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States (award on the merits, 30 August 2000), para 103.
United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation (2001) 89 BCLR (3rd) 359 (BC Supreme Court), para 99.
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linkages between foreign investments and the domestic economy, and many states achieved
success by the use of these tools for these purposes.
Typically, a prohibition on performance requirements (besides the basic national treatment
obligation) in an investment treaty gives a list of the specific types of requirements that are
barred. According to the U.S.-Bolivia BIT: 50
‘Neither Party shall mandate or enforce, as a condition for the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of a covered investment,
any requirement (including any commitment or undertaking in connection with the
receipt of a governmental permission or authorization):
(a) to achieve a particular level or percentage of local content, or to purchase, use or
otherwise give a preference to products or services of domestic origin or from any
domestic source;
(b) to restrict imports by the investment of products or services in relation to a
particular volume or value of production, exports or foreign exchange earnings;
(c) to export a particular type, level or percentage of products or services, either
generally or to a specific market region;
(d) to restrict sales by the investment of products or services in the Party’s territory
in relation to a particular volume or value of production, exports or foreign exchange
earnings;
(e) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a
national or company in the Party’s territory, except pursuant to an order,
commitment or undertaking that is enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or
competition authority to remedy an alleged or adjudicated violation of competition
laws; or
(f) to carry out a particular type, level or percentage of research and development in
the Party’s territory.
Such requirements do not include conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of
an advantage.’
This list provides a shopping list of the steps taken by many states as part of a wider
development policy to expand the domestic economy and support national centres of
capital.
That said, as mentioned above, even in the absence of an express prohibition on
performance requirements – and based on the more general standard of national treatment
under EC-based treaties that do not include such detailed prohibitions – it remains within
Treaty between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. VI.
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the discretion of tribunals to conclude that these types of measures are discriminatory and
therefore prohibited where applied at the post-establishment stage, after an investor is
admitted into the host economy. For this reason, the fact that EC-based BITs do not
contain detailed prohibitions does not preclude them having an effect similar to U.S. or
Canadian BITs where the performance requirement is applied post-establishment. This is
especially the case where market access for European investors has been agreed by way of an
Economic Partnership Agreement. As discussed below, the EU-CARIFORUM EPA also
contains its own prohibition on a detailed list of prohibitions on performance requirements,
including at the pre-establishment and the post-establishment stage, although this EPA
obligation would presumably not be subject directly to investor-state arbitration under a
BIT.
Umbrella clauses and BIT arbitration of disputes arising from an investment contract
An ‘umbrella clause’ creates a duty of the state to observe or respect its obligations to
foreign investors beyond the BIT itself. Thus, the state assumes an obligation under the
treaty to respect any obligation that is has entered into by way of a contract, administrative
order, or other legal instrument that is not part of the treaty itself.
According to the U.S.-Ecuador BIT: ‘Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have
entered into with regard to investments’. 51 Alternatively, the Switzerland-Bolivia BIT
provides: 52
‘Chacune des Parties Contractantes assure à tout moment le respect des engagements
assumés par elle à l’égard des investissements des ressortissants et sociétés de l’autre
Partie Contractante.’
Not all BITs contain an umbrella clause. A difficulty with those that do is the creation of
two parallel systems to enforce the underlying obligation to which the umbrella clause
applies (i.e. one system of enforcement under the treaty and another under the contract or
other legal instrument). It is common for disputes arising from investment contracts to be
submitted to arbitration under the BIT in lieu of (or even in addition to) the alternative legal
process that can be pursued under the dispute settlement clause of the contract.
This leads to a number of complexities. In particular, BITs have generally been interpreted
by arbitrators to allow what is essentially the same dispute (between the state or a state entity
and the foreign investor or a domestic company owned by the foreign investor) to be
submitted to the BIT tribunal in addition to whatever court or tribunal (whether domestic or
international) that has the authority to resolve disputes under the underlying contract. Thus,
in such circumstances, the investor who brings the BIT claim can also bring a parallel claim
(or claims) outside of the BIT. This means that the investor, in the context of a single
dispute, may be able to pursue two different legal proceedings in order to pressure the state
and win compensation from it, arguably in violation of the principle that a party should be
Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Art. 3(c).
52 Accord entre la Confédération suisse et la République de Bolivie concernant la promotion de la protection réciproques
des investissements, Art. 11.
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able to litigate a claim only once, and accept the result that is reached in the litigation that it
pursued. Also, this means that investors – having agreed in a contract with the state to
accept one form of dispute settlement, such as domestic courts, as a condition of the
investor’s rights and responsibilities under the contract – has been allowed by BIT tribunals
to avoid this commitment by litigating a contractual dispute under a BIT. Lastly, in most
cases, disputes that are subject to an umbrella clause tend to arise in the context of sectors
that were privatized by the state and then subjected to regulatory requirements or reforms
opposed by the foreign investor. Privatization programs that were originally planned by the
state to be under the authority of a domestic court or tribunal have in many cases been
opened to international arbitration by the liberal interpretation of an umbrella clause in the
BIT.
An example of both of these aspects of umbrella clauses is offered by the Duke Energy award
against Ecuador. Here a dispute arose from contracts entered into between two firms (both
of which became claimants under the BIT) and Ecuador dealing with the generation of
electrical power in Guayaquil. One claimant, Electroquil (later purchased by the other
claimant, the U.S. firm Duke Energy), was the first private power generator to have been
established in Ecuador (in 1992) following an energy privatization programme. From 1995,
the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificación (INECEL) entered into power purchase
contracts with Electroquil to provide power until 1996. In this year, however, the process of
electricity contracting was liberalized and INECEL was liquidated by legislation, and the
Ministry of Mines and Energy assumed INECEL’s rights and obligations. Under the power
purchase contracts, fuel was to be supplied to Guayaquil by the state entity Petrocomercial
and paid for by INECEL.
A dispute over alleged non-payment by Petroecuador for power supplied under the power
purchase contracts, and over the imposition of fines by INECEL against Electroquil for its
alleged failure to satisfy its obligations, led to a contractual arbitration claim by Electroquil
before the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce. This
claim was dismissed by the tribunal on the basis that the contractual arbitration clause was
invalid under Ecuadorian law. However, Duke Energy and Electroquil then brought the BIT
claim over outstanding disputes under the contract. Thus, they avoided an unfavourable
result in the forum for dispute settlement that had been agreed to in the contract itself by
relying in an umbrella clause in a BIT.
In its decision, the BIT tribunal in Duke Energy concluded that INECEL had breached its
payment obligations arising from the power purchase agreements and that some of the fines
levied against Electroquil were unjustified (although the tribunal found no bad faith on the
part of Ecuador). In turn, the tribunal found that these contractual breaches constituted a
violation of Ecuador’s BIT umbrella clause obligation to ‘observe any obligation it may have
entered into with respect to investments’. (The tribunal also found a violation of fair and
equitable treatment standard on the basis that Ecuador ‘deceived Duke Energy’s reasonable
expectations’ by not implementing a payment guarantee). However, the tribunal limited its
damages award to what it described as the ‘nominal sum’ of approximately (US)$5.7 million
plus interest. Even so, this was $5.7 million more than what Ecuador was obliged to pay to
the investors under the contractual dispute settlement provisions that Electroquil (and, as
Elecroquil’s owner, Duke Energy) had agreed to in the contract itself.

Another illustration of the tensions arising from parallel claims under both a BIT and a
contract, involving the water sector, arose in Aguas del Aconquija. 53 The dispute was rooted in
a 1995 concession contract between Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) and an Argentine
affiliate, on the one hand, and the government of Tucumán, a province of Argentina, on the
other hand. The concession followed a decision by the Tucumán government to privatize its
water and sewage facilities. The contract contained detailed provisions on the service CGE
would provide, tariffs it would charge, and investments it would make. After the agreement
was concluded, disputes arose between CGE and Tucumán over various issues including the
method for measuring water consumption, the level of tariffs, the timing and percentage of
any increase in tariffs, the remedy for non-payment of tariffs, the right of CGE to passthrough to customers certain taxes, and the quality of the water delivered.
CGE alleged that the Tucumán government tried to frustrate its operation of the concession.
According to CGE, this was part of a ‘concerted public attack… which included a series of
inflammatory statements and other acts encouraging customers not to pay their bills’.
Attempts to renegotiate the concession occurred between CGE and Tucumán and, in time,
the national government. Negotiations led to a 1997 framework agreement but, according to
CGE, the governor of Tucumán changed the terms of this agreement before submitting the
necessary implementing legislation to the Tucumán legislature. Further negotiations failed
and CGE sought to rescind the concession on grounds of alleged default by Tucumán.
Tucumán rejected the CGE notice of rescission and terminated the concession itself, alleging
default of performance by CGE. Ten months later, the national government assumed
responsibility for the operation of the water and sewage system.
CGE brought a claim under the France-Argentina BIT. Its argument was that, although
Argentina was not a party to its concession contract with the government of Tucumán,
Argentina had nevertheless failed to prevent Tucumán from its alleged actions concerning
the concession contract and thus infringed the investor’s entitlements to protection under
the BIT. Yet, the concession itself provided for disputes arising under it to be submitted to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tucumán administrative courts. In light of this, the BIT
tribunal refused CGE’s claim on the basis that, for the tribunal to resolve it, the tribunal
would have to undertake a detailed interpretation and application of the contract, a task that
was left by the contracting parties to the Tucumán administrative courts. Also, the tribunal
held that Argentina’s actions did not constitute a direct breach of the BIT. Following a
challenge to this decision by CGE, the decision was overturned by an ICSID annulment
panel of three arbitrators (all appointed by the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council,
i.e. the World Bank President). A new tribunal was constituted, the BIT was permitted to
proceed in spite of the dispute settlement clause in the contract, and Argentina was found to
have violated the BIT, leading to an award of roughly (U.S.)$142 million, including interest,
to the investor.
Ultimately, these cases demonstrates how umbrella clauses have been interpreted by BIT
tribunals to allow investors to avoid their commitments to accept the authority of domestic
courts or tribunals in any disputes arising under a contract concluded between the investor
and a state entity. In turn, states have been ordered by arbitrators to pay substantial damages
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (award on jurisdiction,
12 November 2000).
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to these investors in disputes arising from privatization programs, even when the terms of
the privatization contracts limited the state’s liabilities to orders issued by domestic courts
and tribunals. Thus, umbrella clauses in BITs have made the liabilities of states arising from
privatization programmes far more extensive that they first appeared at the time the program
was put in place.
V

INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION UNDER EPAs

The EU has proposed to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements with a number of
developing states, including Andean Community states. The first such EPA was concluded
between the EU and the CARIFORUM states in late 2007. This reports looks to the text of
that EPA as a model for the investment and services liberalization provisions that an EPA
with CAP states would potentially contain.
At the outset, it is important to note that ‘services’ liberalization, where it involves the
removal of restrictions on foreign ownership and operation in certain sectors of a host
economy, also involves the liberalization of investment. The two concepts overlap; a
‘service’ may be, or may be comprised of, an investments. Likewise, an investor will often be
a service supplier, and vice versa. 54 Thus, when one speaks of the liberalization of services by
the removal of domestic measures restricting the establishment of foreign service suppliers
in a host economy, one also speaks of liberalization of investment, particularly in terms of
pre-establishment or market access privileges.
The EPA model provides, in short, 55 for the states parties to remove restrictions on foreign
ownership of their economy in those sectors where they undertake positive commitments to
liberalize. The commitment to allow market access in liberalized sectors in the EUCARIFORUM EPA states as follows: 56
‘With respect to market access through commercial presence, the EC Party and the
Signatory CARIFORUM States shall accord to commercial presences and investors
of each other a treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the specific
commitments contained in Annex […] (commitments on investment and trade in
services).’
The EPA model also prohibits, in liberalized sectors, a variety of performance requirement
commonly used by states to restrict or screen foreign investment, with a view to enhancing
its benefits for the host economy. In particular the EU-CARIFORUM EPA states: 57
‘In sectors where market access commitments are undertaken, the measures which
the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall not maintain or adopt
For example, where a government restricts foreign ownership in the oil and gas sector, it will by
implication preclude the delivery of oil and gas services by companies via mode 3 of the GATS; that
is, by establishment of a foreign service supplier in the host economy.
55 The author examined the significance of investment provisions in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA in a
report to Oxfam in March 2008.
56 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, Part II, Title II, Article 6(1).
57 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, Part II, Title II, Article 6(2).
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either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory,
unless otherwise specified in Annex […] (commitments on investment and trade in
services) are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of commercial presences whether in the form of
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive rights or other commercial presence
requirements such as economic needs tests;
(b) limitations on the total value of transactions or assets in the form of numerical
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of operations or on the total quantity of output
expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test 58 .
(d) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum
percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate
foreign investment; and
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of establishment (subsidiary,
branch, representative office) 59 or joint ventures through which an investor of the
other Party may perform an economic activity.’
Thus, states parties to the EPA are precluded from imposing a variety of restrictions or
conditions on foreign investment, including limits on the number or share of foreign firms
in a sector, limits on the proportion of a firm or industry that is foreign-owned, the use of an
economic needs test to approve proposed investments, or requirements to engage in joint
ventures with local firms. The prohibition is comparable to the detailed prohibitions on
performance requirements that are contained in BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada,
although applying to the pre-establishment stage only where investments are permitted
according to the EPA’s positive list of commitments to liberalize.
The EPA model establishes further an obligation of national treatment that is likely to
preclude performance requirements that are designed to encourage economic linkages or
protect domestic enterprises. According to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA: 60
‘1. In the sectors where market access commitments are inscribed in Annex [...]
(commitments on investment and trade in services) and subject to any conditions
and qualifications set out therein, with respect to all measures affecting commercial
presence, the EC Party and the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall grant to
Note to text: ‘Subparagraphs 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) do not cover measures taken in order to limit the
production of an agricultural product.’
59 Note to text: ‘Each Party may require that in the case of incorporation under its own law, investors
must adopt a specific legal form. To the extent that such requirement is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, it does not need to be specified in a Party’s schedule of commitments in
order to be maintained or adopted by the Parties.’
60 EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement, Part II, Title II, Article 7.
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commercial presences and investors of each other treatment no less favourable than
that they accord to their own like commercial presences and investors.’
By way of this provision, the states parties to the EPA are precluded from treating domestic
firms in a way that alters the conditions of competition in their favour relative to foreign
firms. (Note that, like BITs, the EPA does not prohibit states from treating foreign investors
more favourably than their domestic counterparts.) The obligation thus appears to bar states
from applying performance requirements (other than via subsidies, 61 meaning the
attachment of conditions by the state to the eligibility of a firm for direct payments of
financial support by the state) to foreign investment as a condition of their commercial
presence including, for example, requirements to employ local personnel, use local materials,
produce for export, or otherwise establish linkages with the domestic economy or protect
domestic enterprises.
A key purpose of EPAs for the EU is thus to provide market access for European investors
that complements and activates the post-establishment protections that already exist for
these investors under existing BITs between EC states and CAP states. As noted above,
unlike BITs concluded by the U.S. and Canada, European BITs do not require the removal
of restrictions on foreign ownership or of other conditions of entry by foreign investors.
That is, they do not extend the state’s national treatment obligation to the pre-establishment
stage of an investment. A critical purpose of provisions on investment and services
liberalization in EPAs is to oblige CAP states to remove such restrictions in order to
facilitate penetration by European firms into the host economy, including its strategic
sectors, which will then trigger the elaborate post-establishment protections provided by
existing BITs.
As a result, when it opens a sector to foreign investment, a CAP state faces the prospect of
rapid penetration of its economy in the relevant sector, and corresponding expanded
liabilities under its BITs. In the experience of some Latin American states that liberalized
strategic sectors such as water, electricity, or telecommunications in the 1990s – especially
Argentina – these liabilities have manifested themselves in a flood of investor claims, the
costs of which have been severe. Argentina has faced dozens of claims under its BITs, and
seven awards to date totaling approximately $752 million in damages, in disputes arising
mainly from sectors liberalized, and purchased by foreign investors, in the 1990s. These
claims have led to damages awards against Argentina in spite of the fact that the foreign
investor in many cases took major risks by borrowing in hard currency to finance asset
acquisitions in Argentina, while relying for revenues on payments by consumers in local
currency. Despite this business decision of investors, arbitrators have awarded them with
market value compensation, at the expense of Argentinian taxpayers, for their losses
arising from general reforms passed by Argentina in the face of a severe financial crisis.
Further, as discussed earlier, the treaty liabilities accompanying foreign investment, once
markets are opened under an EPA, have a strong potential to deter states from taking
steps on behalf of consumers and the population to ensure quality, reliability, and
accessibility of essential services, where doing so may trigger a dispute with a foreign
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investor. The experiences of Argentina in Aguas del Aconquija and Bolivia in Aguas del
Tunari, as discussed above, demonstrate this dynamic.
EPAs must therefore be understood as blocks that build on the existing arbitration
mechanisms of BITs. The EPA does not provide for compulsory investor-state arbitration;
its dispute settlement mechanism relies on state-state arbitration. However, by concluding an
EPA, the state exposes itself to BIT claims by European investors whose investments are
made possible only by the market access commitments in an EPA. The critical point is that,
once the investor enters the state’s economy, all of the post-establishment obligations of the
under its relevant BITs are triggered.
Lastly, any specific or general exceptions contained in an EPA – for measures of public
health or environmental protection, for example – would not apply to the obligations that a
state has undertaken pursuant to a BIT. Only rarely to BITs concluded by EU states contain
broad exceptions for measures undertaken for reasons of public interest and, even when
they do, such exceptions typically do not extend to the provisions most commonly relied on
by tribunals to find a violation of the treaty and order the state to pay damages (especially,
fair & equitable treatment and limitations on expropriation). Thus, for example, the SpainBolivia BIT provides: 62
‘Las medidas que se adopten por razones de orden público o seguridad y salud
pública no se considerarán tratamiento ‹‹menos favorables›› en el sentido del presente
artículo.’
However, this exception applies only to the state parties’ obligations to provide national
treatment and MFN treatment to foreign investors. Moreover, the fact that this exception is
not included in Spain’s BITs with Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru has the alarming implication
that public security and public health measures are not excused from national treatment and
MFN treatment obligations under these other BITs (or even under the Bolivia-Spain BIT
itself, if the MFN clause in that BIT was read liberally to eliminate the exception based on its
exclusion (and thus ‘more favourable’ treatment of investors) in other BITs concluded by
relevant state).
VI

CONCLUSION

BITs presents major fiscal risks to governmental decision-making in a range of sectors,
including strategic sectors such as the extractive sector, transportation, banking and financial
services, government insurance, state enterprises, broadcasting, telephone services, and social
services. Those risks arise primarily from the threat of investor claims that a state is exposed
to as a result of broadly-framed standards of investor protection in BITs and the proclivity
of many arbitration tribunal to interpret those standards broadly in favour of investors. The
system thus shifts political bargaining power dramatically in favour of the business interests
of multinational firms and against other social interests that stand to benefit from measures
to regulate investors or attach conditions to the entry of foreign investment into the
domestic economy.
Acuerdo para la promoción y la protección recíproca de inversiones entre el Reino de España y la República de
Bolivia, Art. 4(5).
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BIT claims are resolved by tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction over host state and
constituted under the authority of organizations at which voting power is concentrated in
the major capital-exporting states or representatives of multinational firms (as in the case of
the World Bank and the International Chamber of Commerce, respectively). Given the
apparent bias – arising from the financial interest of the arbitration industry – in favour of
investors and against respondents, present arrangements for investment treaty arbitration are
understandably regarded to be unfair to developing, capital-importing states. It is of course
true that investors have been unsuccessful in many cases under investment treaties, but they
have also won many claims and received substantial damages following expansively proinvestor interpretations of the treaties by tribunals.
In this environment, in order to protect the regulatory flexibility and responsiveness of
government, states should consider a number of steps to limit their BIT liabilities. First, they
should seek to evaluate whether their BITs have in fact generated increased investment in a
manner that is desirable to the host state’s economic objectives. In the absence of clear
evidence that this is the case, a state should limit its commitments to compulsory arbitration
to consents given in investment contracts, where the state is in a stronger position to link
such a commitment to actual commitments to invest capital. Existing BITs that do not
deliver a demonstrable benefit in terms of increased investment seek either be abrogated at
the earliest opportunity or subjected to renegotiation with the other state party in order to
excoriate their most problematic aspects (including liberal provisions on forum-shopping, an
MFN clause that may be extended to procedural aspects of other BITs, and the allocation of
the authority to appoint arbitrators to business organizations). Notably, in order to remove
its liabilities under investment treaties, a state must seek to limit or withdraw its consents to
compulsory arbitration in BITs (and regional treaties) and not simply to withdraw from
ICSID or from the ICSID Convention. Most BITs allow investors to bring claims not only
before ICSID but also in other forums, for instance pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules.
Lastly, the EU’s project to conclude EPAs with developing states must be understood in
terms of the interaction between, on the one hand, the market access provisions of the EPA
– designed to apply to the pre-establishment stage of investment – and on the other hand
the elaborate, broadly-framed post-establishment protections offered by BITs. Developing
states that allow penetration of the home economy by foreign capital under an EPA risk
some very unwelcome surprises if and when foreign firms later come to dispute aspects of
their regulatory treatment by a host government.

APPENDIX A
Known BIT claims against CAP states
(as at 19 August 2008)
State

Claim

Year
initiat
ed

Relevant treaty
and arbitration
rules

Claimant and sector

Host state measure

Resolution

Bolivia

Aguas del
Tunari

2002

Neth-Bol BIT

Claimant
ADT
was
Bolivian
company, owned by series of Dutch
companies, in turn owned by U.S.
firm Bechtel.

Various acts and omissions of
Bolivia
concerning
the
concession agreement, alleged to
have breached the BIT.

Claim settled in early 2006. Both claimant and
Bolivia agreed to drop financial claims against the
other and that ‘the concession was terminated only
because of the civil unrest and the state of
emergency in Cochabamba and not because of any
act done or not done by the international
shareholders of Aguas del Tunari’. The settlement
followed the extensive public pressure on Bechtel to
withdraw BIT claim.

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.
Claim arose from 1999 concession
contract between ADT and Bolivia’s
Superintendant of Water for exclusive
delivery of water and sewage services
for city of Cochabamba over 40-year
period. The city’s water system was
previously run by the state agency
SEMAPA.

At time of the concession, 20% of
shares in ADT were divided among
four Bolivian companies, 25% were
owned by Uruguay company
Riverstar International, and 55% were
owned by Cayman Islands-based
International Water which was 100%
owned by U.S. firm Bechtel.

The concession contract was subject

Tribunal: U.S. national David Caron, presiding
(appointed by Chair of the ICSID Administrative
Council – i.e. the President of the World Bank);
Canadian national Henri Alvarez (appointed by
investor); Mexican national Jose Alberro-Semerena,
(appointed by Bolivia).

Tribunal found jurisdiction. Tribunal allowed claim
under Netherlands-Bolivia BIT despite forumshopping by Bechtel via the corporate
reorganization that followed mounting public
controversy over the concession. It concluded that
the corporate re-organization did not breach the
concession contract and that it was not necessary to
order production of documents regarding alleged
misrepresentations by Bechtel. In a detailed analysis,

Bolivia

Quimica e
Industrial
del Borax

2006

Chile-Bol BIT

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

of public controversy and criticism by
citizens’ groups from at least the time
it was signed until its termination in
2000 following a major escalation of
public protests. A concern of citizens’
groups was that the concession would
make illegal the existing communal
water
systems,
previously
autonomous of SEMAPA, on which
many of the city’s inhabitants relied.
Great hardship was also caused by
substantial increase in rates that were
implemented shortly under the
concession.

the Tribunal also concluded that there was sufficient
control of ADT by the relevant Dutch holding
companies to allow the BIT claim.

ADT was aware of and engaged in
the public debate from shortly after
the initiation of the concession.
Notably, after the concession and
controversy began, the Cayman
Islands company International Water
was ‘migrated’ to Luxembourg and its
ownership was transferred to a Dutch
company in turn owned (via other
Dutch companies) by Bechtel and
(apparently) the UK firm Edison. The
insertion of this Dutch holding
company into the ownership chain
for the concession contract allowed
for a claim to be brought under the
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.

Tribunal also rejected a petition by nongovernmental organizations to participate in the
proceeding on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to
do so without the consent of the disputing parties.

Claimant is a Chilean chemical firm
that owns majority stake in Bolivian
mining
company
Non-Metallic
Minerals.

Dissenting opinion by arbitrator Alberro-Semerena
would have dismissed the claim on the basis that the
corporate reorganization took place after another
proposal to insert a Dutch holding company into
the corporate structure had been rejected by
Bolivian authorities. This indicated deception or
misrepresentation on the issue of the nationality of
the investors under the concession agreement.

See awards dated 21 October 2005; Investment
Treaty News reports dated 20 January 2006 and 9
May 2007; Bechtel press release dated 19 January
2006.

Rescission
of Non-Metalic
Minerals’ mining concession in
2004 reportedly because the
company systematically withheld
information from the national
customs regarding taxes and for
auditing purposes and because

Tribunal: Swiss national Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, presiding (unknown whether appointed by
ICSID or by agreement of the parties); Canadian
national Marc Lalonde (presumably appointed by
the investor); French national Brigitte Stern
(presumably appointed by Bolivia).

Non-Metallic Minerals had a mining
concession for the exploitation of
ulexite in Salar de Uyuni.

its declared ulexite exports did
not coincide with the cargo
amounts transported.

No jurisdictional award issued.

See Investment Treaty News report dated 14 March
2006.
Bolivia

Euro
Telecom

2007

Neth-Bol BIT

Telecommunications sector.

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

Euro
Telecom
is
reportedly
incorporated in the Netherlands and
wholly owned by Dutch company
International
Communication
Holding, which is in turn owned
100% by Telecom Italia International,
also a Dutch company, in turn owned
100% by Italian company Telecom
Italia, in turn owned by Spanish
Telefonica (42.3%), among others.

Renationalization of Bolivian
telecommunications company
ENTEL after Euro Telecom
allegedly
failed
to
meet
investment requirements and
pay taxes and tax-related fines.
Negotiations
regarding
appropriate compensation were
unsuccessful.

Repsol v
Petroecuad
or

2001

Not a treaty
claim but rather a
contract-based
claim. Case is
noted here to
avoid confusion
with Repsol claim

Contract between Repsol and
Petroecuador (owned by Government
of Ecuador) for oil exploration and
production.

Attempt by Euro Telecom to freeze assets of
Bolivia and ENTEL (on the basis that Bolivia has
refused to recognize ICSID’s jurisdiction) in the UK
was rejected by the Court of Appeal. Other attempts
to freeze assets are ongoing in other jurisdictions.

European Commission has reportedly intervened
with Bolivia in support of Telecom Italia.

Euro Telecom reportedly owns 50%
of ENTEL, a company that provides
more than 60% of Bolivia’s telephone
services.

Ecuador

Claim is ongoing; tribunal not yet constituted; no
jurisdictional award issued.

See UK court decision of 28 July 2008; ICSID
website; Investment Treaty News report dated 17
January 2008; open letter of Corporate Europe
Observatory to EC.
Government of Ecuador sought
negotiate changes to the service
contract under which Repsol
operated for a share-purchase
agreement. A dispute arose over
alleged non-payment of accounts
as between the first and second

Tribunal: Costa Rican national Rodrigo Oreamuno
Blanco, presiding; Ecuadorian national Eduardo
Camigniani Valencia; Ecuadorian national Alberto
Wray Espinosa.

Jurisdiction and violation of contract found. In

discussed below.

contract.

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

finding jurisdiction, tribunal dismissed Ecuador’s
argument, among others, that the dispute had
already been resolved by the National Hydrocarbons
Board. Tribunal awarded approximately (US)$14
million to investor.

Petroecuador’s application for annulment rejected.
Annulment tribunal (all members appointed by
Chair of ICSID Administrative Council – i.e. the
President of the World Bank): US national Judd
Kessler, presiding; Italian national Piero Bernardini;
Chilean national Gonzalo Biggs.

See annulment tribunal award dated 8 January 2008;
H. Perez Loose, ‘Ecuadorian Request to Annul An
Icsid Award is Denied’ (7 February 2007)
www.mondaq.com.
Ecuador

IBM

2002

US-Ecuador BIT

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

Claimant is a U.S. corporation
established under New York law.

An Ecuadorian subsidiary of IBM
was party to a concession contract
with the Republic of Ecuador’s
Ministry of Finances and Public
Credit. IBM claimed that money due
to its subsidiary had not been paid.

The contract was for the provision of
Information Technology services.

Alleged non-payment of monies
owing under a concession
contract.

Claim settled confidentially in July 2004.

Tribunal: Ecuadorian national Jijon Letort, presiding
(method of appointment unknown); Ecuadorian
national Ponce Martinez (method of appointment
unknown);
Roldos
Aguilera
(method
of
appointment unknown).

Jurisdiction found. IBM found to have an
investment under the treaty in the form of the
concession contract itself as well as IBM’s
contractual right to collect monies. By its consent to
arbitration in the BIT, Ecuador ‘irrevocably
commits itself to the ICSID jurisdiction for the

solution of disputes arising from the BIT’ and
Ecuador ‘cannot unilaterally withdraw itself from
the duties it acquired in a sovereign manner when it
freely negotiated the BIT....’. Also, ‘the investor is
the one to select the different ways of solving
controversies... at the moment he files his claim’.
Although the contract provided that disputes arising
under it were to be referred to the tribunals and
courts of Quito, IBM could bring a claim under the
BIT (even as its Ecuadorian subsidiary might pursue
a contractual claim in domestic courts) so long as
IBM had not itself previously initiated court
proceedings in Ecuador.

Dissenting opinion by arbitrator Aguilera declined
to find jurisdiction over the claim on the basis that
IBM was obliged by the contract to submit its
claims to domestic courts.

See awards dated 22 December 2003 and 22 July
2004 (not publicly available); Investment Treaty
News report dated 9 May 2007.
Ecuador

MCI
Power

2002

US-Ecuador BIT

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

Claimants are U.S. corporations that
own and control Seacoast (also a U.S.
company, established under the laws
of Texas) that invested in Ecuador via
a branch operation. The branch
operation agreed to install and
operate
two
electrical
power
generation plants and sell their power
to the Instituto Ecuatoriano de
Electificación
(INECEL),
an
Ecuadorian state entity.

Termination of contract by
INECEL. Dismissal by a
domestic tribunal of Seacoast’s
claims for compensation arising
from alleged breach of contract.

Claim dismissed by tribunal in merits award dated
31 July 2007. Investor had claimed violations of fair
& equitable treatment; national treatment; and
prohibitions on expropriation.

Tribunal: Argentine national Raúl E. Vinuesa,
presiding (appointed by ICSID after consultation
with the parties); Canadian national Benjamin J.
Greenberg (appointed by investor); Chilean national
Jaime Irarrázabal C. (appointed by investor).

Claim arose from termination of the
contract between Seacoast and
INECEL and alleged non-payment of
monies owed.

Jurisdiction limited to claims arising from acts or
omissions that occurred after entry into force of the
treaty. Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over many of the
alleged breaches of the treaty which arose from acts
and omissions preceding entry into force.

Other U.S. subsidiaries of the
claimants
owned
Ecuadorian
subsidiary Ecuapower. A further
claim arose also from a subsequent
contract between Ecuapower and
INECEL to provide power.

On the merits, tribunal rejected argument by
Ecuador that treaty applied only to sovereign acts of
Ecuador and not commercial acts of INECEL.
INECEL was an organ of the state and ‘any acts or
omissions of INECEL in breach of the BIT... are
attributable to Ecuador’. Investor’s nevertheless
claims rejected on basis that the failure to reach
agreement on Seacoast’s liquidation did not arise
from bad faith by INECEL (or Seacoast) and there
was no basis to conclude that revocation of a permit
in the circumstances amounted to an expropriation.

Claim arise because Ecuapower’s
eventual sale of its contractual rights
to other foreign owners was allegedly
under disadvantageous conditions due
to unwarranted delay in the signing of
the contract by INECEL.

Annulment proceedings ongoing. Annulment
tribunal (all members appointed by Chair of ICSID
Administrative Council – i.e. the President of the
World Bank): French national Dominique Hascher,
presiding; Swedish national Hans Danelius;
Slovakian national Peter Tomka.

See award dated 31 July 2007; ICSID website;
Investment Arbitration Reporter report dated 3 June
2008.
Ecuador

Occidental
No. 1

2002

US-Ecuador BIT

Claimant Occidental Exploration and
Production Company (OEPC) is a
U.S. oil firm established under

Denial of VAT refunds to
OEPC by the Servicio de Rentas
Internas (SRI) after OEPC had
previously received such refunds

Claim resolved in favour of the investor, leading to
award of approximately (US)$75 million plus

Filed
under
UNCITRAL
Rules.

California law.

from the SRI.

interest.

Dispute arose following an oil
exploration and production contract
with Petroecuador. The contract was
a participation contract, which
followed earlier services provision
contracts. The dispute involved
whether or not OEPC was entitled to
Value-Added Tax (VAT) refunds, or
whether the cost of VAT had been
incorporated in the terms of the
contract.

OEPC filed four lawsuits in the
tax courts of Ecuador objecting
to the denial of VAT refunds by
the SRI, which were not
resolved at the time the tribunal
decided OEPC’s BIT claim.

Tribunal: Chilean national Francisco OrregoVicuna, presiding (appointed by agreement of coarbitrators); US national Charles Brower (appointed
by investor); Ecuadorian national Patrick Barrera
Sweeney (appointed by Ecuador).

Jurisdiction found. The tribunal allowed the BIT
claim to proceed, although it ran parallel to
challenges brought by OEPC in domestic courts, on
the basis that it was a separate, treaty-based claim
rather than a contractual claim. This was important
because the BIT contained a ‘fork in the road’
clause, whereby an investor was precluded under the
treaty from submitting the same dispute both to
domestic courts and to a BIT tribunal.

In addition, the tribunal concluded that the BIT’s
exception for tax measures did not apply to OEPC’s
claim because ‘in part the dispute finds its origins in
[the contract] insofar as it is disputed whether VAT
reimbursement is included in Factor X [of the
contract]’. This was important because the BIT’s
exception for tax measures was did not apply to a
dispute
concerning
‘the
observance
and
enforcement of terms of an investment Agreement
or authorization’. However, the tribunal’s
conclusion that the dispute arose from a contract
(thus defeating the BIT’s exception for tax
measures) contradicts its conclusion that the dispute
arose from the treaty (thus allowing the investor’s
claim under the BIT despite its parallel resort to
domestic remedies and consequent breach of the

‘fork in the road’ provision).

On the merits, the tribunal found that Ecuador had
violated the BIT by treating the investor arbitrarily;
even though the SRI’s decision-making to deny
VAT refunds was found by the tribunal not to be
based on ‘prejudice or preference’ but rather on
‘reason and fact’, nevertheless, the ‘very confusion
and lack of clarity’ arising from the SRI’s practices
over several years ‘resulted in some form of
arbitrariness, even if not intended’.

Further, on the merits, the tribunal interpreted the
BIT’s most-favoured-nation obligation such that it
was taken to remove any requirement that national
treatment under the BIT be limited to situations in
which two investors are ‘in like circumstances’.
Instead, the tribunal found that national treatment
required Ecuador to provide the same VAT
treatment to oil ‘producers’ (such as OEPC) as it did
to ‘exporters’ of e.g. flowers (which unlike
‘producers’ were eligible for VAT refunds under
Ecuadorian law). This broad reading of national
treatment by the tribunal operated in favour of
OEPC and investment treaty claimants in general.
In addition, the tribunal concluded that, although
the SRI did not intend to discriminate against
OEPC or foreign-owned firms, the less favourable
effects of the SRI’s decision was sufficient to violate
national treatment.

Further, on the merits, the tribunal adopted a broad
reading of the BIT standard of fair & equitable
treatment. Relying on earlier tribunals that adopted a
similarly broad reading, the tribunal found that the

obligation required Ecuador to ‘ensure a transparent
and predictable framework for [investors’] business
planning and investment’ and to ‘act in a consistent
manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign
investor’. Adding to this already broad reading, the
tribunal concluded here that this duty of
transparency and predictability ‘is an objective
requirement that does not depend on whether the
Respondent [state] has proceeded in good faith or
not’. Thus, the good faith decisions of the SRI on
VAT refunds led to a violation of the BIT
obligation of fair & equitable treatment by Ecuador.
Finally, with very little discussion and no reference
to outside authorities, the tribunal concluded that
this reading of fair & equitable treatment (contrary
to what was argued by Ecuador here, and by other
states, including the U.S. and Canada, in other
arbitrations) ‘is not different from that required
under [customary] international law’.

Ecuador applied to UK courts for the award to be
set aside on the basis that the tribunal exceeded its
jurisdiction by finding that the BIT’s exception for
tax measures did not preclude the investor’s claim.
This argument was rejected by the UK courts and
the award was upheld. Importantly, the UK courts
did not review the decision of the tribunal on the
merits of the dispute because this was beyond the
scope of the UK courts’ authority under UK law (in
effect implementing the New York Convention) to
set aside an arbitration award.

See award dated 1 July 2004; England & Wales High
Court of Justice decisions dated 29 April 2005 and 2
March 2006; England & Wales Court of Appeal

dated 9 September 2005 and 4 July 2007.
Ecuador

Encana

2003

Canada-Ecuador
BIT

Claimant Encana was a Canadian
corporation.

Filed
under
UNCITRAL
Rules.

Encana owned two Barbadian
subsidiaries that had entered into
contracts with the state oil company
(PETROECUADOR) for exploration
and exploitation of oil and gas.

Resolutions of Ecuador’s tax
authorities (the Servicio de
Rentas Internas – SRI) that
denied refunds of value added
tax to Encana’s subsidiaries.

The value of the tax credits
denied
was
approximately
(US)$80 million.

The Resolutions arose out of
complex
issues
of
legal
interpretation arising from a
series of amendments to
Ecuador’s Internal Tax Regime
Law and its Regulations.

The Resolution also arose from
an SRI auditors’ review of VAT
refunds granted, especially to oil
companies.

Subsequently, the SRI denied the
availability of VAT refunds to
the Encana subsidiaries on the
basis that (1) VAT paid by the
subsidiaries
was
already
considered in their participation
share at the time of contract
negotiations and (2) VAT

Claim dismissed mainly on basis of the BIT’s
exception for tax measures.

Tribunal: Australian national James Crawford,
presiding (appointed by agreement of coarbitrators); Argentine national Horacio Grigera
Naón (appointed by investor); Canadian national J.
Christopher Thomas (appointed by Ecuador).

On the merits, claim was dismissed because treaty
contained tax exception in relation to all standards
of investor protection other than protections against
expropriation.

The expropriation claim dismissed, first, on the
basis that no issue of indirect expropriation arose
because the tax measure was not extraordinary,
punitive in amount, or arbitrary in its incidence.
Second, in terms of direct expropriation:

‘the executive is entitled to take a position in relation
to claims put forward by individuals, even if that
position may turn out to be wrong in law, provided
it does so in good faith and stands ready to defend
its position before the courts.... An executive agency
does not expropriate the value represented by a
statutory obligation to make a payment or refund by
mere refusal to pay, provided at least that (a) the
refusal is not merely wilful, (b) the courts are open
to the aggrieved private party, (c) the courts’

refunds were available only for
manufactured goods and not
non-renewable
resource
extraction activities.

The Encana subsidiaries (and
other oil companies) challenged
the Resolutions before the
Ecuadorian District Tax Court,
but were unsuccessful; they
appealed to the Ecuadorian
Supreme Court, but withdrew
their appeals when Encana filed
its BIT claim.

A subsequent interpretation of
the Law adopted by the
Ecuadorian National Congress
clarified that VAT refunds were
not available to oil activities on
the basis that oil is extracted and
not manufactured.

decisions are not themselves
repudiated by the State.’

overridden

or

In the circumstances, no direct expropriation
occurred because (a) the oil companies could and
did challenge the SRI’s rulings in the courts, (b)
when the SRI lost it complied promptly with the
court decisions, (c) the SRI Director General was
‘acting in good faith in a matter where the legal
issues were unclear and unsettled’, and (d) there was
no evidence that the court decisions were partisan,
biased against the oil companies, or otherwise nonindependent.

Thus, the SRI’s policy on oil refunds never
repudiated an Ecuadorian legal right and thus did
not amount to expropriation. On the other hand,
the tribunal noted that its conclusion might have
differed in the case of claims to tax refunds that
were still pending before the Ecuadorian courts at
the time of the National Congress’ interpretation of
the Law. The Encana subsidiaries had withdrawn
their challenges well before then, however.

Arbitrator Naon dissented on the expropriation
claim, concluding that there was an expropriation of
the investor’s right to returns, ‘including the
legitimate expectation inextricably associated with
the notion of returns’ and that ‘an interference in
legitimate expectations of the foreign investor...
includes State incoherent conduct obscuring the
national legal treatment of matters directly
determining the foreign investor’s entitlement to
returns covered by the Treaty’. He concluded that
the denial of tax refunds was expropriatory because

the investor’s return was ‘adversely affected in a
substantial way by a measure or string of measures’.
The measures were also discriminatory because they
targeted the oil industry, and because they lacked a
clear and principled public purpose. Further, the
measures were not excused by the legislation
interpreting the Law which ‘may succeed... in
legitimizing such conduct within he province of the
local legal system of such State, but does not
necessarily have a similar effect on the international
plane’. There was lastly no requirement for the
foreign investor to resort to local courts once an act
of the State led to an expropriation claim.

Tribunal concluded that costs of the arbitration
should be born fully by Ecuador. The costs,
including arbitrator fees and expenses as well as
institutional charges, were (US)$685,000.

See awards dated 31 January 2004, 27 February
2004, and 3 February 2006.
Ecuador

Duke
Energy

2004

Ad
hoc
arbitration
agreement
between
claimants
and
Ecuador;
USEcuador BIT.

First claimant, Duke Energy, is a U.S.
incorporated partnership (Delaware)
and the sole parent company of Duke
Energy International del Ecuador.

Second claimant, Electroquil, is an
Ecuadorian
power
generation
company.
Filed
under
ICSID Rules.
Dispute arose from contracts entered

Alleged non-payment for power
supplied under power purchase
agreement.

Imposition of fines by INECEL
against Electroquil for failure to
satisfy
power
purchase
agreement
obligations,
challenged by Electroquil via an
arbitration claim before the
Arbitration
and
Mediation
Center of the Guayaquil
Chamber of Commerce; the

Award issued very recently against Ecuador for
(US)$5.7 million plus interest.

Tribunal: Swiss national Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, presiding (appointed by agreement of the
parties); Columbian national Enrique GomezPinzon (appointed by investor); Dutch national
Albert Jan van den Berg (appointed by Ecuador).

Jurisdiction found under both ad hoc arbitration

into between the claimants and
Ecuador for
electrical
power
generation in Guayaquil. Electroquil
was the first private power generator
established in Ecuador (in 1992).
From 1995, the Instituto Ecuatoriano
de Electrificacion (INECEL) entered
into a power purchase agreements
with Guayaquil to provide power,
until the liberalization of electricity
contracting and liquidation by
legislation of INECEL in 1996 (with
the Ministry of Mines and Energy
assuming INECEL’s rights and
obligations). Under the power
purchase agreements, fuel was to be
supplied to Guayaquil by the state
entity Petrocomercial and paid for by
INECEL.

tribunal dismissed the claim on
the basis that the applicable
arbitration clause was invalid
under Ecuadorian law.

agreement and BIT (with the exception of a dispute
regarding customs duties which the tribunal held fell
outside its jurisdiction due to the BIT’s exception
for tax measures).

Contractual
relationships
between
Electroquil
and
Ecuadorian state entities were
terminated. Duke Energy and
Electroquil entered into an
agreement with Ecuador to refer
outstanding disputes to ICSID
arbitration. Subsequent resort by
claimants to BIT as basis for
claim, alongside the arbitration
agreement.

On the merits, the tribunal concluded that INECEL
breached its payment obligations arising from the
power purchase agreements, and that some of the
fines levied against Electroquil were not justified
(although the tribunal found no bad faith on the
part of Ecuador). Under the BIT, the tribunal
concluded that these contractual breaches
constituted in turn a breach of Ecuador’s obligation
under the BIT’s ‘umbrella clause’ to ‘observe any
obligation it may have entered into with respect to
investments’. Also under the BIT, Ecuador was
found to have violated the fair and equitable
treatment standard because Ecuador ‘deceived Duke
Energy’s reasonable expectations’ by not
implementing a payment guarantee. However, the
tribunal limited its damages award to the ‘nominal
sum’ of approximately (US)$5.7 million plus
interest.

Duke Energy purchased Electroquil
after purchase power contracts were
entered into and fines levied by
INECEL.

See ICSID website; Investment
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008.
Ecuador

Noble
Energy

2005

US-Ecuador BIT

Dispute arose from regulation
measures in Ecuador’s electricity
sector,
following
privatization
program in 1996.

Resolution by CONELEC in
2003 that altered the way in
which MachalaPower treated the
VAT it paid on its purchase of
natural gas for its power plant as
a cost declaration to CENACE.

Claim was brought against Ecuador
and the Consejo Nacional de
Decree

by

the

Ecuadorian

Arbitration

Tribunal: Swiss national Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, presiding (appointed by agreement of
parties); Canadian national Henri Alvarez (appointed
by investor); Spanish national Bernardo M.
Cremades (appointed by Ecuador).

Jurisdiction found based on BIT (as well as
investment contract). Tribunal allowed Noble

Electricidad (CONELEC).

First claimant, Noble Energy, was a
U.S.
company
established
in
Delaware. This claimant brought a
claim before the tribunal under the
BIT and an investment contract
between Samedan Oil Co. (a
subsidiary of Noble Energy) and the
Ecuadorian government that was to
be executed together with the
concession contract discussed below.

Second claimant, indirectly owned by
Noble Energy, was a Cayman Islands
company. It in turn had a branch in
Ecuador where it produces and sells
thermoelectric power in the spot
market and under power purchase
agreements. This claimant brought a
claim before the tribunal under a
concession contract with CONELEC
for the construction, installation, and
operation of an electric power
generation plant. It had commenced
commercial electricity generation in
September 2002.

government that changed the
mechanism for payment of
MachalaPower’s invoices such
that CENACE would no longer
collect from distributors and pay
generators for the electricity sold
in the spot market. Instead, from
October 2003, MachalaPower
was required to invoice and
collect from each distribution
company directly.

Agreements between Ecuador
and Colombia in context of the
Andean
Community
that
allegedly enabled Colombia
generators to export energy to
Ecuador
with
preferential
treatment.

Alleged refusal of Ecuador and
CONELEC to enforce the
existing legal framework by their
not assisting MachalaPower to
collect unpaid receivables from
its customers and by not
allowing MachalaPower to cut
off its dispatch of electricity.

Decrees of the Ecuadorian
government that lowered the
price of oil bought from
Petroecuador
for
certain
government thermal power
generators, allegedly favouring

Energy, although it was an indirect shareholder of
MachalaPower, to bring a claim under the BIT. It
declined to consider Barcelona Traction other than
to dismiss it as a diplomatic protection case that
‘cannot be transposed in to the context of a BIT
which protects direct and indirect investment...’,
including ‘shares... in a company’. On whether there
is any limit to the layers or corporations through
which indirect ownership may be traced, the tribunal
declined to rule on whether there should be any cutoff point, but concluded that the two intermediate
layers of ownership between MachalaPower and
Noble Energy in this case was not too remote.

The arbitration is ongoing on the merits.

See award dated 5 March 2008; ICSID website;
Investment Arbitration Reporter report dated 3 June
2008.

state-owned generators over
MachalaPower by allowing them
to switch to cheaper oil, whereas
MachalaPower used natural gas
to generate electricity.

Alleged violation of national and
MFN treatment, fair & equitable
treatment, protection from
expropriation, and umbrella
clause in BIT. Also, alleged
violation of concession contract
and stabilization clause of
investment agreement.
Ecuador

Empresas
Electrica
del
Ecuador

2005

US-Ecuador BIT

Unknown.

Tribunal: Mexican national Bernardo Sepulveda
Amor,
presiding
(unknown
method
of
appointment); US national John H. Rooney
(unknown whether appointed by investor or by
Ecuador); US national Michael W. Reisman
(unknown whether appointed by investor or by
Ecuador).

Reportedly arises from an alleged
expropriation of an electricity firm in
2000.

No jurisdictional award issued.

See ICSID website; Investment Treaty News report
dated 18 May 2006; Investment Arbitration
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008.
Ecuador

Eurocontro
l

2006

Spain-Ecuador
BIT

Eurocontrol is a Spanish engineering
and construction firm.

Unknown.

Discontinued before a jurisdictional award was
issued. Reportedly settled in May 2008. Unknown
whether tribunal constituted.

Ecuador

Chevron

2006

It is unknown
under what Rules
the claim was
filed.

The dispute reportedly arose from a
refinery expansion project.

US-Ecuador BIT

Chevron is a U.S. oil company.

Filed
under
UNCITRAL
Rules.

The dispute reportedly relates to
longstanding domestic court disputes
over crude oil sales.

See ICSID website; Investment Treaty News Report
dated 9 May 2007; Investment Arbitration Reporter
report dated 3 June 2008.
Unknown.

Tribunal: German national Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel,
presiding (unknown whether appointed via
Permanent Court of Arbitration or by agreement of
co-arbitrators); US national Charles Brower
(presumably appointed by investor); Dutch national
Albert Jan van den Berg (presumably appointed by
Ecuador).

No jurisdictional award yet issued.

See Investment Arbitration Reporter report dated 3
June 2008.
Ecuador

Occidental
No. 2

2006

US-Ecuador BIT

First
claimant
is
Occidental
Petroleum Corporation, a U.S. oil
company.

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.
Second claimant is
Exploration
and
Company.

Occidental
Production

Claim under BIT as well as
Participation Contract of 1999
between OEPC, Ecuador, and
Petroecuador in connection with
exploration and exploitation of

Caducidad Decree issued in May
2006 by Attorney General to
Ministry of Energy and Mines to
terminate Participation Contract
(and related agreements) for
alleged violations of the
Participation Contract, including
alleged (1) transfer of rights and
obligations
under
the
Participation Contract to AEC (a
Bermuda-based subsidiary of
Canadian oil and gas company
EnCana) without ministerial
approval, (2) entry into a
consortium to carry out
exploration and exploitation
without ministerial approval, (3)
non-investment of minimum

Tribunal: Canadian national Yves Fortier, presiding
(unknown whether appointed by ICSID or by
agreement of the parties); New Zealand national
David A.R. Williams (presumably appointed by
investor); French national Brigitte Stern (presumably
appointed by Ecuador).

No jurisdictional award yet issued.

See award dated 17 August 2007; ICSID website;
Investment Treaty News report dated 9 May 2007.

hydrocarbons in ‘Block 15’ of the
Ecuadorian Amazon.

amounts required under the
Participation
Contract,
(4)
repeated violations of the
Hydrocarbons
Law
and
regulations.

Claim stated to exceed $1 billion.
Ecuador

Tecnicas
Reunidas

2006

Spain-Ecuador
BIT

Tecnicas Reunidas is a Spanish
engineering and construction firm.

Unknown.

The dispute reportedly arose from a
refinery expansion project.

Ecuador

Murphy
Oil

2008

US-Ecuador BIT

Murphy is a U.S. oil company.

See ICSID website; Investment Treaty News report
dated 9 May 2007; Investment Arbitration Reporter
report dated 3 June 2008.
Unknown, but see description of
Repsol (2008).

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.
Ecuador

Perenco

2008

France-Ecuador
BIT

Repsol

2008

Spain-Ecuador
BIT

Filed

under

Tribunal not constituted.

See ICSID website; Investment
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008.
Perenco is a French oil company.

Unknown, but see description of
Repsol (2008).

Repsol is a Spanish oil company.

Ecuador sought to renegotiate
the terms of its concession
contracts for oil and gas
production. It sought to raise the
state’s share of extraordinary oil
company profits from 50% to

Arbitration

Tribunal not constituted.

See ICSID website; Investment
Reporter report dated 3 June 2008.

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

Ecuador

Discontinued before a jurisdictional award was
issued. Reportedly settled in May 2008. Unknown
whether tribunal constituted.

Arbitration

Repsol reportedly agreed in August 2008 to convert
its current participation contracts in Ecuador into
service provider contracts, in exchange for the
extension of Repsol’s production concessions until
2018. It will reportedly transfer its ICSID claim to a

ICSID Rules.

99%. Extraordinary profits were
those that flowed where the
market price of oil rose above a
benchmark price laid out in the
concessions. An offer was later
made by Ecuador to reduce this
increase in the state’s share from
99% to 70%. This offer was
conditional on the relevant firms
converting their ‘participation’
concession contracts to ‘service’
contracts (see below) and
maintaining current levels of
investment and output. It was
also conditional on the firms
withdrawing any claims they had
brought before ICSID or other
arbitration bodies, and resorting
instead to the use of domestic
courts to resolve disputes with
Ecuador.

‘regional UN court based in Santiago, Chile’.

See Dow Jones, ‘Repsol Agrees to Sign Service
Provider Deal With Ecuador (11 August 2008); M
Alvaro, ‘Ecuador Oil Min Makes New Offer to Cut
Windfall Tax’ (12 June 2008).

Under
the
participation
contracts, the state receives a
percentage of the profits earned
from oil production. Under the
(proposed)
new
service
contracts, the companies would
receive a production fee and
reimbursement
for
their
investment costs.
Ecuador

ConocoPhilipps

2008

US-Ecuador BIT

Conoco-Phillips
company.

is

a

U.S.

oil

Unknown, but see description of
Repsol (2008).

Unknown whether any awards issued.

See Investment Arbitration Reporter report dated 3
June 2008.

Peru

Luchetti

2002

Peru-Chile BIT

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

First claimant was Chilean company
that owned 98% of the shares of the
second claimant, a Peruvian company,
which owned a property in Lima
where it had constructed an industrial
plant for the manufacture and sale of
pasta. The property was close to, but
not within, a protected wetland.

Annulment by Municipality of
Lima in 1997-98 of the permits
granted to second claimant for
construction of its industrial
plant, referring to environmental
problems
and
supposed
deficiencies in the granting of
the permits. This annulment was
the subject of Peruvian judicial
proceedings in which the second
claimant was successful.

Claim dismissed on the basis that dispute preceded
conclusion of BIT and was thus outside tribunal’s
jurisdiction.

Tribunal: US national Thomas Buergenthal,
presiding (appointed by ICSID SG after
consultation with parties); French national Jan
Paulsson (appointed by investor), Spanish national
Bernardo M. Cremades (appointed by Peru).

Application to annul the award rejected. Annulment
tribunal (all members appointed by Chair of ICSID
Administrative Council – i.e. the President of the
World Bank): Swedish national Hans Danelius,
presiding, Italian national Andrea Giardini, and UK
national Franklin Berman (who dissented and would
have annulled the award).

See award dated 7 February 2005; annulment
tribunal award dated 5 September 2007.
Peru

TSG Peru

2007

China-Peru BIT

Filed
under
ICSID Rules.

Claim by Tza Yap Shum, a Chinese
national, who owns 90% of TSG
Peru.

Seeks US$20 million for alleged
expropriation of fish flour company
TSG Peru, which is involved in the
manufacturing, import, export, and
distribution of fish flour intended for

Charge to TSG Peru by
Superintendencia Nacional de
Administración
Tributaria
(Sunat) for alleged tax debt of
about US$4 million and alleged
confiscation of TSG’s bank
accounts.

Unknown whether tribunal constituted.

See Investment Treaty News report 2 March 2007.

the Asian market.

First claim ever by a Chinese investor
before ICSID.

APPENDIX B
Inclusion of key provisions in Spain’s BITs with CAP states
Key provisions
provision for investor-state arbitration
application to all acts or measures of state
application to all investments, incl intellectual property
waiver of duty to exhaust local remedies
allowance for forum-shopping by investors

use of private arbitrators
allocation of appointing authority
allowance for state liability as remedy
national treatment
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment
fair & equitable treatment. full protection & security
restrictions on expropriation, incl regulatory expropriation
guarantee of free capital transfers
specific prohibitions on performance requirements
umbrella clause
exceptions for local or sub-national state measures
exceptions for specific measures

Spain-Bolivia
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes, subject only to
requirement for six
months’ consultation.
No, except (potentially)
via MFN clause or liberal
interpretation of ‘seat’ by
arbitrators.
Yes
ICSID, UNCITRAL
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Exception to national
treatment and MFN
treatment for
participation in free trade
zone, customs or
economic union, or other
regional economic
organization.
Exception to national

Spain-Colombia*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes, subject only to
requirement for six
months’ consultation.
No, except (potentially)
via MFN clause or liberal
interpretation of ‘seat’ by
arbitrators.
Yes
ICSID, UNCITRAL
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Exception to fair &
equitable treatment and
MFN treatment for
participation in customs
union or common
market.
Exception to fair &
equitable treatment and
MFN treatment for tax

Spain-Ecuador
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes, subject only to
requirement for six
months’ consultation.
No, except (potentially)
via MFN clause or liberal
interpretation of ‘seat’ by
arbitrators.
Yes
ICSID, UNCITRAL
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Exception to fair &
equitable treatment,
national treatment, and
MFN treatment for
participation in free trade
zone, customs union, or
common market.
Exception to fair &
equitable treatment,

Spain-Peru
Yes
Yes, subject only to
requirement for six
months’ consultation.
No, except (potentially)
via MFN clause or liberal
interpretation of ‘control’
by arbitrators.
Yes
ICSID, UNCITRAL
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Exception to MFN
treatment for
participation in free trade
zone, customs union, or
common market.
Exception to MFN
treatment for tax treaties.

treatment and MFN
treatment for tax treaties.

exceptions for specific sectors
duration of states’ obligations

Exception to national
and MFN treatment for
measures of public order
and security or of public
health.
No
10 + additional 10 years
for existing investments.
Minimum duration is 10
years, after which treaty
can be denounced with
six months’ notice.
After denunciation, the
obligations for existing
investments continue for
an additional 10 years.

treaties.

national treatment, and
MFN treatment for tax
treaties.

Exception to guarantee
of free capital transfers
for capital controls for a
limited period to address
exceptional of balance of
payments difficulties.
No
10 + additional 10 years
for existing investments;
limited window for
denunciation.

No
10 + additional 10 years
for existing investments;
limited window for
denunciation.

Minimum duration is 10
years, after which the
treaty automatically
renews for an additional
term of 10 years. Treaty
can be denounced only
during the six months
prior to expiry at the end
of the applicable 10 year
term.

Minimum duration is 10
years, after which the
treaty automatically
renews for an additional
term of 5 years. Treaty
can be denounced only
during the six months
prior to expiry at the end
of the applicable 10 or 5
year term.

After denunciation, the
obligations for existing
investments continue for
an additional 10 years.

After denunciation, the
obligations for existing
investments continue for
an additional 10 years.

Source for texts of BITs: UNCTAD Investment Agreements Online (Country-specific Lists of BITs)

15 + additional 15 years
for existing investments.
Minimum duration is 15
years, after which treaty
can be denounced with
12 months’ notice.
After denunciation, the
obligations for existing
investments continue for
an additional 15 years.

